1200KM / telemetry
Script Execution — Detection Telemetry
Script content or script execution observations from an interpreter-aware sensor.
Collection and providers
Collect PowerShell 4104 with script-block ID and fragment sequence; instrument other engines separately rather than assigning them the same event ID.
- PowerShell Script Block Logging: Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.
- Sysmon process events: Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.
- Linux Audit: execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.
Configuration
- Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.
- Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.
- On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records.
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'
Id = 4104
} -MaxEvents 5Read-only check after Script Block Logging is configured. For PowerShell 7 use its registered PowerShellCore/Operational channel. Missing events are not proof of no execution; check policy, channel and permissions.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0029",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"engine": "PowerShell",
"script_block_id": "lab-script-1",
"fragment": 1,
"fragments_total": 1,
"script_text": "Write-Output \"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK\""
}
}Visibility and validation
Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
- T1016.001 · Internet Connection Discovery · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1027.018 · Invisible Unicode · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1037 · Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1037.001 · Logon Script (Windows) · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1037.003 · Network Logon Script · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1037.004 · RC Scripts · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1056.002 · GUI Input Capture · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.003 · Windows Command Shell · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.004 · Unix Shell · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.005 · Visual Basic · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.006 · Python · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.007 · JavaScript · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.011 · Lua · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1087 · Account Discovery · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1119 · Automated Collection · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1127.001 · MSBuild · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1132.001 · Standard Encoding · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1132.002 · Non-Standard Encoding · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1491.001 · Internal Defacement · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1505.001 · SQL Stored Procedures · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1546 · Event Triggered Execution · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1547.015 · Login Items · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1552.006 · Group Policy Preferences · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1556.006 · Multi-Factor Authentication · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1559 · Inter-Process Communication · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1620 · Reflective Code Loading · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1651 · Cloud Administration Command · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1674 · Input Injection · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1678 · Delay Execution · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0802 · Automated Collection · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0840 · Network Connection Enumeration · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0853 · Scripting · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0893 · Data from Local System · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0894 · System Binary Proxy Execution · Detection rules & anomalies
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
- AADInternals · S0677
- AsyncRAT · S1087
- Brute Ratel C4 · S1063
- cmd · S0106
- Cobalt Strike · S0154
- Covenant · S1155
- Diskpart · S9002
- Donut · S0695
- Empire · S0363
- evilginx2 · S9003
- FRP · S1144
- IronNetInjector · S0581
- Koadic · S0250
- MCMD · S0500
- Mythic · S0699
- NPPSPY · S1131
- Out1 · S0594
- Pacu · S1091
- PcShare · S1050
- PoshC2 · S0378
- PowerSploit · S0194
- Pupy · S0192
- QuasarRAT · S0262
- Remcos · S0332
- ROADTools · S0684
- ShimRatReporter · S0445
- SILENTTRINITY · S0692
- Sliver · S0633
Connected anomaly research
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.