1200KM / detection
T1056.002 GUI Input Capture — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1056.002 GUI Input Capture: 3 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- GUI Input Capture - macOS · test · low · {"product":"macos","category":"process_creation"}
- CredUI.DLL Loaded By Uncommon Process · test · medium · {"category":"image_load","product":"windows"}
- PUA - Mouse Lock Execution · test · medium · {"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0521 Behavioral Detection of Spoofed GUI Credential Prompts
AN1440 Analytic 1440
Detects suspicious use of PowerShell, .NET, or script interpreters to spawn processes that mimic UAC prompts, often with credential capture dialogue boxes invoked from non-standard parent processes.
AN1441 Analytic 1441
Detects GUI-based credential prompts invoked via zenity/kdialog/dialog or X11 APIs from non-user-facing scripts or background shell sessions, often with authentication-related text.
AN1442 Analytic 1442
Detects AppleScript or Objective-C usage to generate fake authentication windows (e.g., using display dialog or NSAlert) from user-launched or persistence-related processes.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.