1200KM / detection
T1132.001 Standard Encoding — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1132.001 Standard Encoding: 4 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Ps Script · test · medium · {"product":"windows","category":"ps_script","definition":"Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled"}
- DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- Gzip Archive Decode Via PowerShell · test · medium · {"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"}
- Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creation · test · medium · {"product":"windows","category":"process_creation"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0124 Behavior-chain detection for T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding (Base64/Hex/MIME) across Windows, Linux, macOS, ESXi
AN0345 Analytic 0345
Process invokes a standard encoder (e.g., PowerShell -enc, certutil -encode, base64 via .NET/Invoke-Expression) or emits long Base64/hex literals → shortly followed by outbound network egress with high bytes_out:bytes_in ratio or HTTP headers/payloads containing Base64/MIME blocks.
AN0346 Analytic 0346
Shell/utility (base64, xxd -p, od, openssl enc -base64, python/perl base64 libraries) encodes data → subsequent outbound connections (curl/wget/bash TCP, socat, python requests) with high asymmetry or Base64/MIME blobs in HTTP/DNS payloads.
AN0347 Analytic 0347
Processes use base64/xxd/openssl/python Objective‑C APIs to encode data (seen in EndpointSecurity exec events or Unified Logs) → quick outbound connections with large bytes_out or HTTP POSTs carrying Base64/MIME bodies.
AN0348 Analytic 0348
ESXi shell (BusyBox) or VMware utilities (openssl, python if present) used to Base64/hex encode data from datastore or config files → followed by abnormal egress from the host (NSX/flow logs) with asymmetric bytes_out or HTTPS posts to non-management endpoints.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.