1200KM / detection
Detection workspace for T1119 Automated Collection: 4 Sigma sources, 1 Atlas concepts and 1 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
COUNT(data_access_event BY actor, fixed_window) >= threshold AND process_or_identity NOT_IN approved_collectors -> ALERTComparison unit: identity or process.
Expected behavior: stable access volume, object mix, and rate.
Deviation: tail-level volume, access burst, or sustained level shift.
Automated execution of native utilities and scripts to discover, enumerate, and exfiltrate files and clipboard content. Focus is on detecting repeated file access, scripting engine use, and use of command-line utilities commonly leveraged by collection scripts.
Repeated or automated access to user document directories or clipboard using shell scripts or utilities like xclip/pbpaste. Detectable via auditd syscall logs or osquery file events.
Use of pbpaste, AppleScript, or third-party automation frameworks (e.g., Automator) to collect clipboard or file content in bursts. Observable via unified logs.
Suspicious sign-ins to Graph API or sensitive resources using non-browser scripting agents (e.g., Python, PowerShell), often for programmatic access to mailbox or OneDrive content.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.