1200KM / detection
T1620 Reflective Code Loading — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1620 Reflective Code Loading: 2 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Potential In-Memory Execution Using Reflection.Assembly · test · medium · {"product":"windows","category":"ps_script","definition":"Script Block Logging must be enable"}
- PowerShell Base64 Encoded Reflective Assembly Load · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0300 Detection Strategy for Reflective Code Loading
AN0838 Analytic 0838
Detect anomalous chains of memory allocation and execution inside the same process (e.g., VirtualAlloc → memcpy → VirtualProtect → CreateThread). Unlike process injection, reflective code loading does not perform cross-process memory writes — the suspicious activity occurs entirely within the process’s own PID context.
AN0839 Analytic 0839
Monitor for in-process mmap + mprotect + execve/execveat activity where memory permissions are changed from writable to executable inside the same process without a corresponding ELF on disk.
AN0840 Analytic 0840
Suspicious calls to dlopen(), dlsym(), or mmap with RWX flags in processes that do not typically perform dynamic module loading. Monitor anonymous memory regions executed by user processes.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.