Complete technique description
Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.
Once adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, adversaries may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to bypass expected functionality.[Mandiant APT42][Azure AD Conditional Access Exclusions]
For example, modifying the Windows hosts file (`C:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If a "fail open" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. [Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022]
Depending on the scope, goals, and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts in a victim's network environment.[Russians Exploit Default MFA Protocol - CISA March 2022]
Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix
Parent and sub-techniques
Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.
Detection telemetry and configuration
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
Active Directory Object Modification · source-mapped
DC0066 collection page — Enable Audit Directory Service Changes with appropriate object SACLs on lab DCs; retain 5136 attribute/value and correlation context.
Providers and collection configuration
- Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
- For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
- Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.
Required normalized fields: object_dn, attribute, before, after.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0066",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"object_dn": "CN=LabUser,OU=Lab,DC=example,DC=test",
"attribute": "description",
"before": "Lab account",
"after": "Lab account reviewed"
}
}
Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.
Application Log Content · source-mapped
DC0038 collection page — Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.
- Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.
- Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart.
Required normalized fields: service, action, actor, record_count, result.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0038",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"service": "lab-portal",
"action": "export_requested",
"actor": "lab-reader",
"record_count": 3,
"result": "authorized"
}
}
Visibility limits: Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.
Cloud Service Modification · source-mapped
DC0069 collection page — Collect the service-specific update API and resulting configuration state; record account/project, actor and changed settings.
Providers and collection configuration
- In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.
- Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.
- Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies.
Required normalized fields: service, resource_id, attribute, before, after.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0069",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"service": "lab-audit-service",
"resource_id": "lab-service-1",
"attribute": "retention_days",
"before": 7,
"after": 30
}
}
Visibility limits: AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.
File Modification · source-mapped
DC0061 collection page — Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: path, attribute, before, after.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0061",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
"attribute": "content_hash",
"before": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
"after": "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Script Execution · source-mapped
DC0029 collection page — Collect PowerShell 4104 with script-block ID and fragment sequence; instrument other engines separately rather than assigning them the same event ID.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.
- Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.
- On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records.
Required normalized fields: engine, script_block_id, fragment, fragments_total, script_text.
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'
Id = 4104
} -MaxEvents 5
Read-only check after Script Block Logging is configured. For PowerShell 7 use its registered PowerShellCore/Operational channel. Missing events are not proof of no execution; check policy, channel and permissions.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0029",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"engine": "PowerShell",
"script_block_id": "lab-script-1",
"fragment": 1,
"fragments_total": 1,
"script_text": "Write-Output \"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK\""
}
}
Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.
User Account Authentication · source-mapped
DC0002 collection page — Collect successful and failed sign-ins, authentication method, application and conditional-access context; distinguish account validation from session creation.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.
- Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.
- Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately.
Required normalized fields: account, application, result, reason, source_ip.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0002",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"account": "analyst@example.test",
"application": "lab-portal",
"result": "failure",
"reason": "invalid_credential",
"source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
}
}
Visibility limits: A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.
User Account Modification · source-mapped
DC0010 collection page — Enable Audit User Account Management and retain the changed attributes and target account; correlate approved administrative requests.
Providers and collection configuration
- Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
- For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
- Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.
Required normalized fields: target_account, attribute, before, after.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0010",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"target_account": "lab-temp",
"attribute": "enabled",
"before": false,
"after": true
}
}
Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.