1200KM / simulation
Adversaries may simulate keystrokes on a victim’s computer by various means to perform any type of action on behalf of the user, such as launching the command interpreter using keyboard shortcuts, typing an inline script to be executed, or interacting directly with a GUI-based application. These actions can be preprogrammed into adversary tooling or executed through physical devices such as Human Interface Devices (HIDs). For example,…
Adversaries may simulate keystrokes on a victim’s computer by various means to perform any type of action on behalf of the user, such as launching the command interpreter using keyboard shortcuts, typing an inline script to be executed, or interacting directly with a GUI-based application. These actions can be preprogrammed into adversary tooling or executed through physical devices such as Human Interface Devices (HIDs).
For example, adversaries have used tooling that monitors the Windows message loop to detect when a user visits bank-specific URLs. If detected, the tool then simulates keystrokes to open the developer console or select the address bar, pastes malicious JavaScript from the clipboard, and executes it - enabling manipulation of content within the browser, such as replacing bank account numbers during transactions.[BleepingComputer BackSwap][welivesecurity BackSwap]
Adversaries have also used malicious USB devices to emulate keystrokes that launch PowerShell, leading to the download and execution of malware from adversary-controlled servers.[BleepingComputer USB]
Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
DC0064 collection page — Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.
Required normalized fields: interpreter, command_line, actor_uid, session_id.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0064",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"interpreter": "/bin/sh",
"command_line": "printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK",
"actor_uid": 1000,
"session_id": "lab-session-1"
}
}Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.
DC0042 collection page — Collect OS device/mount events plus read-only volume inventory; distinguish physical attachment, partition creation and logical mapping.
Required normalized fields: device_id, mount_point, action.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0042",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"device_id": "lab-disk-2",
"mount_point": "/mnt/lab",
"action": "attach"
}
}Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.
DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.
<EventFiltering>
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
</ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0032",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
"parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"command_line": "whoami",
"user": "LAB\\analyst"
}
}Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
DC0029 collection page — Collect PowerShell 4104 with script-block ID and fragment sequence; instrument other engines separately rather than assigning them the same event ID.
Required normalized fields: engine, script_block_id, fragment, fragments_total, script_text.
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'
Id = 4104
} -MaxEvents 5Read-only check after Script Block Logging is configured. For PowerShell 7 use its registered PowerShellCore/Operational channel. Missing events are not proof of no execution; check policy, channel and permissions.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0029",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"engine": "PowerShell",
"script_block_id": "lab-script-1",
"fragment": 1,
"fragments_total": 1,
"script_text": "Write-Output \"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK\""
}
}Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.
Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering
Detects suspicious USB HID device enumeration and keystroke injection patterns, such as rapid sequences of input with no user context, scripts executed through simulated keystrokes, or rogue devices presenting themselves as keyboards.
Platforms: Windows.
Detects USB HID device enumeration under `/sys/bus/usb/devices/` and rapid keystroke injection resulting in command execution such as bash or Python scripts launched without interactive user activity.
Platforms: Linux.
Detects abnormal HID device enumeration via I/O Registry (ioreg -p IOUSB) and keystroke injection targeting AppleScript, osascript, or PowerShell equivalents. Defender correlates new USB device connections with rapid script execution.
Platforms: macOS.
No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.
No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1674 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.
Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.
Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots
No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.
Atomic evidence: no compatible candidate in this snapshot. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.
Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.
No compatible Atomic procedure is present in this pinned evidence set. Technical feasibility has not been ruled out. A custom procedure must define the behavior, target, collection point, success observable and rollback before execution.
Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook
This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Input Injection, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.
Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.
All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook
Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.
Limit the use of USB devices and removable media within a network.
Denylist scripting and use application control where appropriate. For example, PowerShell Constrained Language mode can be used to restrict access to sensitive or otherwise dangerous language elements such as those used to execute arbitrary Windows APIs or files (e.g., `Add-Type`).[Microsoft PowerShell CLM]
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.