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T1546 Event Triggered Execution — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events. Adversaries may…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.[Backdooring an AWS account][Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration][Microsoft DART Case Report 001]

Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.[FireEye WMI 2015][Malware Persistence on OS X][amnesia malware]

Since the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges.

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Parent and sub-techniques

Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Cloud Service Modification · source-mapped

DC0069 collection page — Collect the service-specific update API and resulting configuration state; record account/project, actor and changed settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.
  • Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.
  • Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies.

Required normalized fields: service, resource_id, attribute, before, after.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0069",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "service": "lab-audit-service",
    "resource_id": "lab-service-1",
    "attribute": "retention_days",
    "before": 7,
    "after": 30
  }
}

Visibility limits: AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.

Command Execution · source-mapped

DC0064 collection page — Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.
  • Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.
  • On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records.

Required normalized fields: interpreter, command_line, actor_uid, session_id.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0064",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "interpreter": "/bin/sh",
    "command_line": "printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK",
    "actor_uid": 1000,
    "session_id": "lab-session-1"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.

File Metadata · source-mapped

DC0059 collection page — Collect scoped file inventory/FIM metadata with hash algorithm and observation time; preserve original timestamps separately from collector time.

Providers and collection configuration

  • osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
  • Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
  • Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
  • Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
  • Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.

Required normalized fields: path, size_bytes, sha256, owner_uid.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0059",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "path": "/opt/lab/demo.txt",
    "size_bytes": 64,
    "sha256": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
    "owner_uid": 1000
  }
}

Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.

File Modification · source-mapped

DC0061 collection page — Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: path, attribute, before, after.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0061",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "attribute": "content_hash",
    "before": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
    "after": "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Network Traffic Content · source-mapped

DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
  • Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
  • Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
  • Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
  • Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0085",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
    "protocol": "http",
    "method": "GET",
    "path": "/lab-check",
    "payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

Process Creation · source-mapped

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Scheduled Job Creation · source-mapped

DC0001 collection page — Enable Audit Other Object Access Events for Windows task creation (4698); retain task XML. For cron/systemd timers, collect scheduler definitions and change events separately.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
  • For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
  • Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: task_name, action, principal, schedule, program.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0001",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "task_name": "LabDailyCheck",
    "action": "create",
    "principal": "lab-user",
    "schedule": "daily",
    "program": "lab-check.exe"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

Script Execution · source-mapped

DC0029 collection page — Collect PowerShell 4104 with script-block ID and fragment sequence; instrument other engines separately rather than assigning them the same event ID.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.
  • Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.
  • On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records.

Required normalized fields: engine, script_block_id, fragment, fragments_total, script_text.

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
  LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'
  Id = 4104
} -MaxEvents 5

Read-only check after Script Block Logging is configured. For PowerShell 7 use its registered PowerShellCore/Operational channel. Missing events are not proof of no execution; check policy, channel and permissions.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0029",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "engine": "PowerShell",
    "script_block_id": "lab-script-1",
    "fragment": 1,
    "fragments_total": 1,
    "script_text": "Write-Output \"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK\""
  }
}

Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.

WMI Creation · source-mapped

DC0008 collection page — For permanent subscriptions, collect Sysmon WmiEvent 19–21 and retain filter, consumer and binding information; this is not comprehensive auditing of every WMI operation.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence.

Required normalized fields: object_kind, namespace, object_name, action.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0008",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "object_kind": "event_filter",
    "namespace": "root/subscription",
    "object_name": "LabFilter",
    "action": "create"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Windows Registry Key Modification · source-mapped

DC0063 collection page — Use RegistryEvent 13 for value-set and 14 for rename; compare against intended policy and keep original type/value where available.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence.

Required normalized fields: registry_path, event_type, value_type, value.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0063",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "registry_path": "HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode",
    "event_type": "SetValue",
    "value_type": "DWORD",
    "value": 1
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0010 Behavioral Detection of Event Triggered Execution Across Platforms

MITRE detection strategy

AN0024 Analytic 0024

Correlates unexpected modifications to WMI event filters, scheduled task triggers, or registry autorun keys with subsequent execution of non-standard binaries by SYSTEM-level processes.

Platforms: Windows.

AN0025 Analytic 0025

Detects inotify or auditd configuration changes that monitor system files coupled with execution of script interpreters or binaries by cron or systemd timers.

Platforms: Linux.

  • File Metadata — auditd:SYSCALL; channel Inotify watch creation or auditctl changes on /etc/cron* or /lib/systemd/system/.
  • Scheduled Job Creation — linux:syslog; channel Execution of non-standard script or binary by cron.
  • Command Execution — auditd:SYSCALL; channel Execution of script interpreters by systemd timer (ExecStart).

AN0026 Analytic 0026

Correlates launchd plist modifications with subsequent unauthorized script execution or anomalous parent-child process trees involving user agents.

Platforms: macOS.

  • File Modification — macos:unifiedlog; channel Modification of ~/Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchDaemons plist.
  • Process Creation — macos:unifiedlog; channel Execution of launchctl with suspicious arguments.

AN0027 Analytic 0027

Monitors cloud function creation triggered by specific audit log events (e.g., IAM changes, object creation), followed by anomalous behavior from new service accounts.

Platforms: IaaS.

AN0028 Analytic 0028

Correlates Power Automate or similar logic app workflows triggered by SaaS file uploads or email rules with data forwarding or anomalous access patterns.

Platforms: SaaS.

  • Cloud Service Modification — m365:unified; channel Creation of Power Automate flow triggered by OneDrive or Exchange event.
  • Command Execution — m365:unified; channel Automated forwarding or file sync initiated by a logic app.

AN0029 Analytic 0029

Detects macros or VBA triggers set to execute on document open or close events, often correlating with embedded payloads or C2 traffic shortly after execution.

Platforms: Office Suite.

  • Script Execution — m365:office; channel VBA auto_open, auto_close, or document_open events.
  • Network Traffic Content — m365:office; channel External HTTP/DNS connection from Office binary shortly after macro trigger.
Source rule directory and observation requirements

7 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1546 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Cloud control plane: Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity.
  • Script and command execution: Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility.
  • Host state and inventory: Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion.
  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Network and protocol telemetry: Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects.
  • Windows and directory audit: Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

4 source-documented software associations
  • S0658 XCSSET — malware.

    XCSSET's `dfhsebxzod` module searches for `.xcodeproj` directories within the user’s home folder and subdirectories. For each match, it locates the corresponding `project.pbxproj` file and embeds an encoded payload into a build rule, target configuration, or project setting. The payload is later executed during the build process.[Microsoft March 2025 XCSSET][April 2021 TrendMicro XCSSET]

    Exact relationship: relationship--e939c173-65a4-453e-b45e-d3cbef9b10dd
  • S1091 Pacu — tool.

    Pacu can set up S3 bucket notifications to trigger a malicious Lambda function when a CloudFormation template is uploaded to the bucket. It can also create Lambda functions that trigger upon the creation of users, roles, and groups.[GitHub Pacu]

    Exact relationship: relationship--804f7690-6bf2-41dc-a6d2-59c3d4394ce5
  • S1164 UPSTYLE — malware.

    UPSTYLE creates a `.pth` file beginning with the text `import` so that any time another process or script attempts to reference the modified item the malicious code will also run.[Volexity UPSTYLE 2024]

    Exact relationship: relationship--d61fe745-b222-48de-aa48-1b948780b9dd
  • S9043 Mini Shai-Hulud — malware.

    Mini Shai-Hulud has modified settings and configuration files of AI coding agents and other coding applications in order to create event triggered executions through creating hooks and runOn conditions.[Flashpoint Mini Shai-Hulud MAY 2026]

    Exact relationship: relationship--efc15678-c8f8-4225-98bb-f9d070e163fe

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: 9 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

Adding custom debugger for Windows Error Reporting

When applications hang, the Windows Error Reporting framework allows us to attach a debugger, if it is set up in the Registry.
Adding executable of choice will let the executable to auto-execute when during any application crash due to functioning of WER framework

Pinned Atomic procedure · 17d1a3cc-3373-495a-857a-e5dd005fb302 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Load custom DLL on mstsc execution

Adding ClxDllPath under Terminal Server Client subkey of HKLM hive with a path to custom DLL allows for DLL loading during execution of mstsc.exe

Pinned Atomic procedure · 2db7852e-5a32-4ec7-937f-f4e027881700 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • dll_inf: custom DLL to be executed (type Path; source default C:\Windows\System32\amsi.dll)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

HKCU - Persistence using CommandProcessor AutoRun key (Without Elevation)

An adversary may abuse the CommandProcessor AutoRun registry key to persist. Every time cmd.exe is executed, the command defined in the AutoRun key also gets executed. reference

Pinned Atomic procedure · 36b8dbf9-59b1-4e9b-a3bb-36e80563ef01 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • command: Command to Execute (type string; source default notepad.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Persistence via ErrorHandler.cmd script execution

Create persistence by triggering script within ErrorHandler.cmd upon the execution of specific binaries within the oobe directory.
Upon test execution, Setup.exe will be executed to further execute script within ErrorHandlercmd to launch Notepad.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 547a4736-dd1c-4b48-b4fe-e916190bb2e7 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • ErrorHandler.cmd script must exist on disk at specified at PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\ErrorHandler.cmd
HKLM - Persistence using CommandProcessor AutoRun key (With Elevation)

An adversary may abuse the CommandProcessor AutoRun registry key to persist. Every time cmd.exe is executed, the command defined in the AutoRun key also gets executed. reference

Pinned Atomic procedure · a574dafe-a903-4cce-9701-14040f4f3532 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • command: Command to Execute (type string; source default notepad.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Persistence with Custom AutodialDLL

The DLL pointed to by the AutodialDLL registry key is loaded every time a process connects to the internet. Attackers can gain persistent code execution by setting this key to a DLL of their choice.

The sample dll provided, AltWinSock2DLL, will launch the notepad process. Starting and stopping a web browser such as MS Edge or Chrome should result in the dll executing. Blog

Pinned Atomic procedure · aca9ae16-7425-4b6d-8c30-cad306fdbd5b · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • AltWinSock2DLL DLL must exist on disk at specified at PathToAtomicsFolder\T1546\bin\AltWinSock2DLL.dll
WMI Invoke-CimMethod Start Process

The following Atomic will create a New-CimSession on a remote endpoint and start a process usnig Invoke-CimMethod.
This is a novel way to perform lateral movement or to start a remote process.
This does require WinRM to be enabled. The account performing the run will also need to be elevated.
A successful execution will stdout that the process started. On the remote endpoint, wmiprvse.exe will spawn the given process.

Pinned Atomic procedure · adae83d3-0df6-45e7-b2c3-575f91584577 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • dest: destination computer name (type string; source default localhost)
  • password: password for account (type string; source default P@ssword1)
  • username: account to use (type string; source default Administrator)
  • process: process to spawn (type string; source default calc.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Persistence using automatic execution of custom DLL during RDP session

When remote desktop session is accepted, the system queries the key it queries the Registry key:HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\AddIns\TestDVCPlugin.
If such key exists, the OS will attempt to read the Path value underneath.Once the Path is read, the DLL that it points to will be loaded via LoadLibrary.

Pinned Atomic procedure · b7fc4c3f-fe6e-479a-ba27-ef91b88536e3 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Persistence using STARTUP-PATH in MS-WORD

When Word starts, it searches for the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\Word\Options\STARTUP-PATH and if it exists,
it will treat it as a user specific start-up folder and load the contents of the folder with file extensions of .wll,.lnk,.dotm,.dot,.dotx
The registry key can be abused to load malware from the mentioned path. Reboot might be required.

Pinned Atomic procedure · f0027655-25ef-47b0-acaf-3d83d106156c · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1546 Event Triggered Execution; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Event Triggered Execution, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Source procedure platform / method / executor tags:

Detection and collection

T1546 detection workspace

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.