T0802 Automated Collection — Attack Simulation

DC0064 collection page — Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.

Providers and collection configuration

• PowerShell Script Block Logging: Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.
• Sysmon process events: Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.
• Linux Audit: execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.

• Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.
• Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.
• On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records.

Required normalized fields: interpreter, command_line, actor_uid, session_id.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0064",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "interpreter": "/bin/sh",
    "command_line": "printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK",
    "actor_uid": 1000,
    "session_id": "lab-session-1"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.

DC0039 collection page — Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.

Providers and collection configuration

• Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
• Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
• Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.

• On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
• Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
• For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_id, path, action, size_bytes.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0039",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_id": 4200,
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "action": "create",
    "size_bytes": 64
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.

Providers and collection configuration

• Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
• Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.

• Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
• Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
• Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0085",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
    "protocol": "http",
    "method": "GET",
    "path": "/lab-check",
    "payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

DC0029 collection page — Collect PowerShell 4104 with script-block ID and fragment sequence; instrument other engines separately rather than assigning them the same event ID.

Providers and collection configuration

• PowerShell Script Block Logging: Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.
• Sysmon process events: Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.
• Linux Audit: execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.

• Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.
• Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.
• On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records.

Required normalized fields: engine, script_block_id, fragment, fragments_total, script_text.

Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
  LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'
  Id = 4104
} -MaxEvents 5

Read-only check after Script Block Logging is configured. For PowerShell 7 use its registered PowerShellCore/Operational channel. Missing events are not proof of no execution; check policy, channel and permissions.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0029",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "engine": "PowerShell",
    "script_block_id": "lab-script-1",
    "fragment": 1,
    "fragments_total": 1,
    "script_text": "Write-Output \"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK\""
  }
}

Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.

MITRE detection strategy

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

• S0093 Backdoor.Oldrea — malware.

  Using OPC, a component of Backdoor.Oldrea gathers any details about connected devices and sends them back to the C2 for the attackers to analyze. [Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014]

  Exact relationship: relationship--8f76d408-be8a-478e-8a5a-aab1d1f96572
• S0604 Industroyer — malware.

  Industroyer automatically collects protocol object data to learn about control devices in the environment. [Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017]

  Exact relationship: relationship--c4122b58-f1b2-4656-a715-55016700bf75
• S1072 Industroyer2 — malware.

  Industroyer2 leverages a hardcoded list of remote-station IP addresses to iteratively initiate communications and collect information across multiple priority IEC-104 priority levels.[Industroyer2 Forescout July 2022]

  Exact relationship: relationship--6ff846b1-9444-45f1-837a-4eeeb16bdfe7

• M0807 Network Allowlists

  Utilize network allowlists to restrict unnecessary connections to network devices (e.g., comm servers, serial to ethernet converters) and services, especially in cases when devices have limits on the number of simultaneous sessions they support.
  

• M0930 Network Segmentation

  Prevent unauthorized systems from accessing control servers or field devices containing industrial information, especially services used for common automation protocols (e.g., DNP3, OPC).