Detection telemetry and configuration
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
Module Load · source-mapped
DC0016 collection page — Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_id, image_loaded, signed, action.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0016",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_id": 4200,
"image_loaded": "C:\\Lab\\demo.dll",
"signed": false,
"action": "load"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
OS API Execution · source-mapped
DC0021 collection page — Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.
- Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.
- Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart.
Required normalized fields: process_id, api, path, result.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0021",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_id": 4200,
"api": "CreateFileW",
"path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
"result": "success"
}
}
Visibility limits: Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.
Process Access · source-mapped
DC0035 collection page — Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: source_process_id, target_process_id, granted_access, action.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0035",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"source_process_id": 4200,
"target_process_id": 4300,
"granted_access": "0x1000",
"action": "open_process"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Process Creation · source-mapped
DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.
<EventFiltering>
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
</ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>
This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0032",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
"parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"command_line": "whoami",
"user": "LAB\\analyst"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Script Execution · source-mapped
DC0029 collection page — Collect PowerShell 4104 with script-block ID and fragment sequence; instrument other engines separately rather than assigning them the same event ID.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.
- Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.
- On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records.
Required normalized fields: engine, script_block_id, fragment, fragments_total, script_text.
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'
Id = 4104
} -MaxEvents 5
Read-only check after Script Block Logging is configured. For PowerShell 7 use its registered PowerShellCore/Operational channel. Missing events are not proof of no execution; check policy, channel and permissions.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0029",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"engine": "PowerShell",
"script_block_id": "lab-script-1",
"fragment": 1,
"fragments_total": 1,
"script_text": "Write-Output \"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK\""
}
}
Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.
Simulation design and documented procedures
Atomic evidence: 3 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.
Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.
Reflective PE Injection via PowerSploit
Uses PowerSploit's Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection to reflectively load a PE file into the
current PowerShell process.
Reference: https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/CodeExecution/Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1
Pinned Atomic procedure · 114c2b95-d992-4c03-8c38-fc58420a3eb5 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
script_url: URL to download Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1 (type url; source default https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/refs/heads/dev/data/module_source/code_execution/Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1)script_path: Local path to save Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1 (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\Powersploit\Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1)pe_path: Path to the PE file to reflectively load (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\T1620\bin\reflective_load.dll)pe_url: URL to download PE file from if not available locally (type url; source default https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1620/bin/reflective_load.dll)exe_args: Arguments passed to the reflectively loaded executable (type string; source default
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
2 prerequisite definitions:
- Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1 must be on disk
- PE file must be on disk
WinPwn - Reflectively load Mimik@tz into memory
Reflectively load Mimik@tz into memory technique via function of WinPwn
Pinned Atomic procedure · 56b9589c-9170-4682-8c3d-33b86ecb5119 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
No input arguments declared.
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Turla Mosquito (CommanderDLL.dll) Dynamic Export Address Table (EAT) Patching
Emulates the behavior of Turla's Mosquito main backdoor. Loads a benign DLL that has no export for "StartRoutine" on disk. During
DllMain, the DLL constructs an IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY in memory at the tail of its mapped image (past .reloc), then patches its own PE header's
data-directory entry so the export RVA points to the fabricated table. Effectively hides the DLL's real entry point from static analysis and export-name-based detection.
Pinned Atomic procedure · 7c3e0b89-09e6-4f3c-a1e8-1c1dfa9288ce · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
dll_path: Path to the compiled EAT-patching DLL (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\T1620\bin\CommanderDLL.dll)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
1 prerequisite definitions:
- The EAT-patching DLL must be present on disk
Technique-specific experiment contract
- Choose one procedure implementing T1620 Reflective Code Loading; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
- Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
- Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
- Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
- Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.