T1037.004 RC Scripts — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify. Adversaries may establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to rc.local, rc.common, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.…

Technique description

At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.

Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models

Documented simulation candidates

rc.local
linux automated sh
Procedure 126f71af-e1c9-405c-94ef-26a47b16c102; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
rc.common
macos automated bash
Procedure 97a48daa-8bca-4bc0-b1a9-c1d163e762de; elevation required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
rc.common
linux automated bash
Procedure c33f3d80-5f04-419b-a13a-854d1cbdbf3a; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

enterprise cloud-hosted-endpoint network-infrastructure onprem virtualization macOS Linux Network Devices ESXi persistence privilege-escalation isolated_authorized_lab procedure_review_required telemetry_configuration_required some_candidates_require_elevation

can_simulate subtechnique source_mapped

Detection and collection

T1037.004 detection workspace

Attack tools

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.