1200KM / telemetry
Logon Session Creation — Detection Telemetry
Creation of a logon session with account and logon-type context.
Collection and providers
Enable Audit Logon and collect successful session creation on the receiving host; join session/logon IDs rather than only account names.
- Windows Security auditing: Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.
Configuration
- Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
- For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
- Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0067",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"account": "LAB\\analyst",
"logon_id": "0x12345",
"logon_type": 3,
"source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
}
}Visibility and validation
A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
- T1021 · Remote Services · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1021.001 · Remote Desktop Protocol · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1021.002 · SMB/Windows Admin Shares · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1021.003 · Distributed Component Object Model · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1021.004 · SSH · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1021.005 · VNC · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1021.006 · Windows Remote Management · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1021.007 · Cloud Services · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1021.008 · Direct Cloud VM Connections · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1037.001 · Logon Script (Windows) · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.004 · Unix Shell · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1070.005 · Network Share Connection Removal · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1078 · Valid Accounts · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1078.001 · Default Accounts · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1078.003 · Local Accounts · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1078.004 · Cloud Accounts · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1111 · Multi-Factor Authentication Interception · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1114 · Email Collection · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1114.002 · Remote Email Collection · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1136.002 · Domain Account · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1185 · Browser Session Hijacking · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1189 · Drive-by Compromise · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1199 · Trusted Relationship · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1213.001 · Confluence · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1213.002 · Sharepoint · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1213.003 · Code Repositories · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1213.004 · Customer Relationship Management Software · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1213.005 · Messaging Applications · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1480 · Execution Guardrails · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1480.001 · Environmental Keying · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1505.003 · Web Shell · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1526 · Cloud Service Discovery · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1534 · Internal Spearphishing · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1538 · Cloud Service Dashboard · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1539 · Steal Web Session Cookie · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1547.013 · XDG Autostart Entries · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1550 · Use Alternate Authentication Material · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1550.002 · Pass the Hash · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1550.003 · Pass the Ticket · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1550.004 · Web Session Cookie · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1552.001 · Credentials In Files · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1556.001 · Domain Controller Authentication · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1556.003 · Pluggable Authentication Modules · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1556.007 · Hybrid Identity · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1558.003 · Kerberoasting · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1563 · Remote Service Session Hijacking · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1563.001 · SSH Hijacking · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1563.002 · RDP Hijacking · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1566 · Phishing · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1606 · Forge Web Credentials · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1606.001 · Web Cookies · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1606.002 · SAML Tokens · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1657 · Financial Theft · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1684 · Social Engineering · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1684.001 · Impersonation · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1686.002 · Network Device Firewall · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0811 · Data from Information Repositories · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0823 · Graphical User Interface · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0859 · Valid Accounts · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0860 · Wireless Compromise · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0886 · Remote Services · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1694 · Insecure Credentials · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1694.001 · Default Credentials · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1694.002 · Hardcoded Credentials · Detection rules & anomalies
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
- AADInternals · S0677
- Brute Ratel C4 · S1063
- Cobalt Strike · S0154
- CrackMapExec · S0488
- Empire · S0363
- evilginx2 · S9003
- Imminent Monitor · S0434
- Impacket · S0357
- Koadic · S0250
- LaZagne · S0349
- MailSniper · S0413
- Mimikatz · S0002
- Net · S0039
- NPPSPY · S1131
- Pacu · S1091
- Pass-The-Hash Toolkit · S0122
- Peirates · S0683
- PoshC2 · S0378
- PowerSploit · S0194
- PsExec · S0029
- Pupy · S0192
- QuasarRAT · S0262
- ROADTools · S0684
- Rubeus · S1071
- SILENTTRINITY · S0692
- spwebmember · S0227
- TruffleHog · S9009
Connected anomaly research
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.