1200KM / detection
T1550.003 Pass the Ticket — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1550.003 Pass the Ticket: 4 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Uncommon Outbound Kerberos Connection · test · medium · {"category":"network_connection","product":"windows"}
- HackTool - Rubeus Execution - ScriptBlock · test · high · {"product":"windows","category":"ps_script","definition":"Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled"}
- HackTool - KrbRelayUp Execution · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- HackTool - Rubeus Execution · stable · critical · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0352 Detection Strategy for T1550.003 - Pass the Ticket (Windows)
AN1000 Analytic 1000
Detects unauthorized Kerberos ticket injection by correlating service ticket (TGS - 4769) requests with absent corresponding account logons (4624) and prior Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT - 4768) activity. Highlights anomalous service ticket generation chains involving unexpected users, hosts, or times, and suspicious injection of tickets via mimikatz-like tooling into LSASS memory. Behavior also includes network lateral movement using Kerberos authentication absent expected interactive logon patterns.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.