Complete technique description
Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.
Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from Steal Web Session Cookie, Steal Application Access Token, and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, Private Keys, or other cryptographic seed values.[GitHub AWS-ADFS-Credential-Generator] Adversaries may also forge tokens by taking advantage of features such as the `AssumeRole` and `GetFederationToken` APIs in AWS, which allow users to request temporary security credentials (i.e., Temporary Elevated Cloud Access), or the `zmprov gdpak` command in Zimbra, which generates a pre-authentication key that can be used to generate tokens for any user in the domain.[AWS Temporary Security Credentials][Zimbra Preauth]
Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: Use Alternate Authentication Material), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.[Pass The Cookie][Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019][Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance]
Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix
Parent and sub-techniques
Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.
Detection telemetry and configuration
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
File Access · source-mapped
DC0055 collection page — Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.
Providers and collection configuration
- Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
- For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
- Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.
Required normalized fields: path, access, actor, result.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0055",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
"access": "read",
"actor": "LAB\\analyst",
"result": "success"
}
}
Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.
Logon Session Creation · source-mapped
DC0067 collection page — Enable Audit Logon and collect successful session creation on the receiving host; join session/logon IDs rather than only account names.
Providers and collection configuration
- Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
- For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
- Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.
Required normalized fields: account, logon_id, logon_type, source_ip.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0067",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"account": "LAB\\analyst",
"logon_id": "0x12345",
"logon_type": 3,
"source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
}
}
Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.
Network Traffic Content · source-mapped
DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.
Providers and collection configuration
- Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
- Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
- Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
- Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
- Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.
Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0085",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
"protocol": "http",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/lab-check",
"payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
}
}
Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.
Process Access · source-mapped
DC0035 collection page — Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: source_process_id, target_process_id, granted_access, action.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0035",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"source_process_id": 4200,
"target_process_id": 4300,
"granted_access": "0x1000",
"action": "open_process"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Web Credential Creation · source-mapped
DC0006 collection page — Collect issuer/admin audit for credential creation with non-secret key or credential ID, owner and expiry; never record the secret value.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.
- Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.
- Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately.
Required normalized fields: application_id, credential_id, action, expires_at.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0006",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"application_id": "lab-app",
"credential_id": "key-lab-1",
"action": "issue",
"expires_at": "2026-09-28T12:00:00Z"
}
}
Visibility limits: A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.
Web Credential Usage · source-mapped
DC0007 collection page — Join workload/non-interactive sign-in or application access records to non-secret credential identifiers and resource results.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.
- Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.
- Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately.
Required normalized fields: credential_id, resource, action, result, source_ip.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0007",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"credential_id": "key-lab-1",
"resource": "lab-api",
"action": "authenticate",
"result": "success",
"source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
}
}
Visibility limits: A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.