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T1550.003 Pass the Ticket — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.

When preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by OS Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.[ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks][GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket]

A Silver Ticket can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).[ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks]

A Golden Ticket can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.[Campbell 2014]

Adversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, "overpassing the hash" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. Pass the Hash) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.[Stealthbits Overpass-the-Hash]

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Parent and sub-techniques

Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Active Directory Credential Request · source-mapped

DC0084 collection page — Enable the relevant Account Logon subcategories on DCs, including Kerberos Authentication Service and Service Ticket Operations; preserve service/account, encryption and result.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
  • For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
  • Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: account, service_principal, request_type, result.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0084",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "account": "lab-user",
    "service_principal": "cifs/lab-server.example.test",
    "request_type": "service_ticket",
    "result": "success"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

Logon Session Creation · source-mapped

DC0067 collection page — Enable Audit Logon and collect successful session creation on the receiving host; join session/logon IDs rather than only account names.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
  • For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
  • Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: account, logon_id, logon_type, source_ip.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0067",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "account": "LAB\\analyst",
    "logon_id": "0x12345",
    "logon_type": 3,
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

Module Load · source-mapped

DC0016 collection page — Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_id, image_loaded, signed, action.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0016",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_id": 4200,
    "image_loaded": "C:\\Lab\\demo.dll",
    "signed": false,
    "action": "load"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Process Access · source-mapped

DC0035 collection page — Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: source_process_id, target_process_id, granted_access, action.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0035",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "source_process_id": 4200,
    "target_process_id": 4300,
    "granted_access": "0x1000",
    "action": "open_process"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

User Account Authentication · source-mapped

DC0002 collection page — Collect successful and failed sign-ins, authentication method, application and conditional-access context; distinguish account validation from session creation.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.
  • Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.
  • Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately.

Required normalized fields: account, application, result, reason, source_ip.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0002",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "account": "analyst@example.test",
    "application": "lab-portal",
    "result": "failure",
    "reason": "invalid_credential",
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0352 Detection Strategy for T1550.003 - Pass the Ticket (Windows)

MITRE detection strategy

AN1000 Analytic 1000

Detects unauthorized Kerberos ticket injection by correlating service ticket (TGS - 4769) requests with absent corresponding account logons (4624) and prior Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT - 4768) activity. Highlights anomalous service ticket generation chains involving unexpected users, hosts, or times, and suspicious injection of tickets via mimikatz-like tooling into LSASS memory. Behavior also includes network lateral movement using Kerberos authentication absent expected interactive logon patterns.

Platforms: Windows.

Source rule directory and observation requirements

4 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1550.003 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Windows and directory audit: Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance.
  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Identity and SaaS: Per identity and application: first-seen clients/resources, changes in authentication failures and session patterns, and unusual permission changes. Separate automation, travel, shared egress and identity-provider policy changes.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

3 source-documented software associations

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: 2 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

Rubeus Kerberos Pass The Ticket

Requesting a TGT on a remote system and retrieving it locally before requesting a service ticket with it. This is a Pass-The-Ticket attack because the TGT is obtained on the remote system, then used from a different machine (local).
PsExec is used to execute commands on the remote system, and the "C$" admin share is used to retrieve the TGT, so the current user must have admin rights remotely and other PsExec prerequisites must be met.

Pinned Atomic procedure · a2fc4ec5-12c6-4fb4-b661-961f23f359cb · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • target: Remote system to request the TGT from (type string; source default localhost)
  • user_name: username associated with the ticket (privileged account not required) (type string; source default Administrator)
  • password: password for user_name (type string; source default Password)
  • domain: domain (type string; source default $Env:USERDOMAIN)
  • rubeus_url: URL of Rubeus executable (type url; source default https://github.com/morgansec/Rubeus/raw/de21c6607e9a07182a2d2eea20bb67a22d3fbf95/Rubeus/bin/Debug/Rubeus45.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

2 prerequisite definitions:

  • Rubeus must exist on disk at "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rubeus.exe"
  • PsExec must exist on disk at "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe"
Mimikatz Kerberos Ticket Attack

Similar to PTH, but attacking Kerberos

Pinned Atomic procedure · dbf38128-7ba7-4776-bedf-cc2eed432098 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • ticket: Ticket file name usually format of 'id-username\@domain.kirbi' (e.g. can be dumped by "sekurlsa::tickets /export" module) (type string; source default )
  • mimikatz_exe: Path of the Mimikatz binary (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\bin\x64\mimikatz.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Mimikatz must exist on disk at specified location (#{mimikatz_exe})

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1550.003 Pass the Ticket; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Pass the Ticket, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Source procedure platform / method / executor tags:

Detection and collection

T1550.003 detection workspace

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.