1200KM / detection
Detection workspace for T1021 Remote Services: 10 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 1 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
No exact concept selected.
Comparison unit: user-source-destination graph.
Expected behavior: administrative connections follow recurring paths.
Deviation: new edge, unusual path, or broad fan-out from one source.
Logon via RDP or WMI by a user account followed by uncommon command execution, file manipulation, or lateral network connections.
SSH session from new source IP followed by interactive shell or privilege escalation (e.g., sudo, su) and outbound lateral connection.
Remote login via ARD or SSH followed by screensharingd process activity or modification of TCC-protected files.
Use of cloud-based bastion or VM console session followed by commands that initiate outbound SSH or RDP sessions from the cloud instance to other environments.
vSphere API logins (vimService) or SSH to ESXi host followed by unauthorized shell commands or lateral remote logins from the ESXi host.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.