T0860 Wireless Compromise — Attack Simulation

DC0067 collection page — Enable Audit Logon and collect successful session creation on the receiving host; join session/logon IDs rather than only account names.

Providers and collection configuration

• Windows Security auditing: Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.

• Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
• For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
• Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: account, logon_id, logon_type, source_ip.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0067",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "account": "LAB\\analyst",
    "logon_id": "0x12345",
    "logon_type": 3,
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

DC0078 collection page — Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.

Providers and collection configuration

• Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
• Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
• AWS VPC Flow Logs: IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.

• Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
• Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
• Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: source_ip, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, bytes_sent, bytes_received.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0078",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "bytes_sent": 128,
    "bytes_received": 512
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

DC0034 collection page — Collect read-only process inventory with PID plus start time/stable identity, command line and collection time; restrict access to potentially sensitive arguments.

Providers and collection configuration

• osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
• Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.

• Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
• Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
• Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.

Required normalized fields: process_id, image, owner_uid, started_at.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0034",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_id": 4200,
    "image": "/usr/bin/sleep",
    "owner_uid": 1000,
    "started_at": "2026-09-27T11:59:00Z"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.

MITRE detection strategy

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

• M0802 Communication Authenticity

  Do not inherently rely on the authenticity provided by the network/link layer (e.g., 802.11, LTE, 802.15.4), as link layer equipment may have long lifespans and protocol vulnerabilities may not be easily patched. Provide defense-in-depth by implementing authenticity within the associated application-layer protocol, or through a network-layer VPN. [CISA March 2010] Furthermore, ensure communication schemes provide strong replay protection, employing techniques such as timestamps or cryptographic nonces.
  

• M0806 Minimize Wireless Signal Propagation

  Techniques can include (i) reducing transmission power on wireless signals, (ii) adjusting antenna gain to prevent extensions beyond organizational boundaries, and (iii) employing RF shielding techniques to block excessive signal propagation. [DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory April 2019]
  

• M0808 Encrypt Network Traffic

  Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications.
  

• M0813 Software Process and Device Authentication

  Ensure wireless networks require the authentication of all devices, and that all wireless devices also authenticate network infrastructure devices (i.e., mutual authentication). For defense-in-depth purposes, utilize VPNs or ensure that application-layer protocols also authenticate the system or device. Use protocols that provide strong authentication (e.g., IEEE 802.1X), and enforce basic protections, such as MAC filtering, when stronger cryptographic techniques are not available.