Complete technique description
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.[MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop]
Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.[Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging] Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.[Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server][Unit 42 Hildegard Malware]
Adversaries may also establish persistence on network by configuring a Tor hidden service on a compromised system. Adversaries may utilize the tool `ShadowLink` to facilitate the installation and configuration of the Tor hidden service. Tor hidden service is then accessible via the Tor network because `ShadowLink` sets up a .onion address on the compromised system. `ShadowLink` may be used to forward any inbound connections to RDP, allowing the adversaries to have remote access.[The BadPilot campaign] Adversaries may get `ShadowLink` to persist on a system by masquerading it as an MS Defender application.[Russian threat actors dig in, prepare to seize on war fatigue]
Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix
Detection telemetry and configuration
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
Application Log Content · source-mapped
DC0038 collection page — Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.
- Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.
- Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart.
Required normalized fields: service, action, actor, record_count, result.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0038",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"service": "lab-portal",
"action": "export_requested",
"actor": "lab-reader",
"record_count": 3,
"result": "authorized"
}
}
Visibility limits: Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.
Logon Session Metadata · source-mapped
DC0088 collection page — Collect supported session inventory and correlate session IDs with authentication, logon and logoff events.
Providers and collection configuration
- osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
- Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
- Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
- Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
- Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.
Required normalized fields: session_id, account, host, session_type.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0088",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"session_id": "lab-session-1",
"account": "LAB\\analyst",
"host": "lab-host-1",
"session_type": "interactive"
}
}
Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.
Network Connection Creation · source-mapped
DC0082 collection page — Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, initiated.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0082",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
"destination_port": 443,
"protocol": "tcp",
"initiated": true
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Network Traffic Flow · source-mapped
DC0078 collection page — Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.
Providers and collection configuration
- Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
- Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
- AWS VPC Flow Logs: IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.
- Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
- Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
- Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.
Required normalized fields: source_ip, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, bytes_sent, bytes_received.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0078",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"source_ip": "192.0.2.10",
"destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
"destination_port": 443,
"protocol": "tcp",
"bytes_sent": 128,
"bytes_received": 512
}
}
Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.
User Account Authentication · source-mapped
DC0002 collection page — Collect successful and failed sign-ins, authentication method, application and conditional-access context; distinguish account validation from session creation.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.
- Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.
- Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately.
Required normalized fields: account, application, result, reason, source_ip.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0002",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"account": "analyst@example.test",
"application": "lab-portal",
"result": "failure",
"reason": "invalid_credential",
"source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
}
}
Visibility limits: A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.
Simulation design and documented procedures
Atomic evidence: 1 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.
Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.
Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 vpn extension
Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension, please see "T1133\src\list of vpn extension.txt" to view complete list
Pinned Atomic procedure · 4c8db261-a58b-42a6-a866-0a294deedde4 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
chrome_url: chrome installer download URL (type url; source default https://dl.google.com/tag/s/appguid%3D%7B8A69D345-D564-463C-AFF1-A69D9E530F96%7D%26iid%3D%7BFD62DDBC-14C6-20BD-706F-C7744738E422%7D%26lang%3Den%26browser%3D3%26usagestats%3D0%26appname%3DGoogle%2520Chrome%26needsadmin%3Dprefers%26ap%3Dx64-stable-statsdef_1%26installdataindex%3Dempty/chrome/install/ChromeStandaloneSetup64.exe)extension_id: chrome extension id (type string; source default "fcfhplploccackoneaefokcmbjfbkenj", "fdcgdnkidjaadafnichfpabhfomcebme"
)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
1 prerequisite definitions:
Technique-specific experiment contract
- Choose one procedure implementing T1133 External Remote Services; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
- Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
- Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
- Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
- Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.