Basic Detection Rules by MITRE ATT&CK TTP
Unified Atlas: research and illustrated explanations · operational families · model catalog · telemetry contracts · validation boundaries. A taxonomy reference is not proof of a configured sensor or an effective detector.
This catalog provides vendor-neutral algorithmic logic for basic deterministic detection rules mapped to MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise techniques and sub-techniques. Rules use signatures, fixed thresholds, allowlists, denylists, state changes, and bounded-window correlations. They do not depend on learned baselines or statistical anomaly models.
Each rule is a starting point. Exact thresholds, approved lists, paths, ports, identities, and time windows must be adapted to the environment. Inline links point to log-source definitions capable of supplying the required events.
Rule Logic Conventions
MATCH: exact, substring, regular-expression, category, or field match.COUNT: number of matching events grouped by an entity within a fixed time window.DISTINCT_COUNT: number of unique values observed within a fixed time window.SEQUENCE: ordered events correlated by entity within a fixed time window.STATE_CHANGE: a protected setting, object, permission, or resource changes from an approved state.NOT_IN: value is absent from an explicit approved list.MISSING: an expected heartbeat or event is absent for a fixed duration.SUM: aggregate of a numeric field grouped by an entity within a fixed time window.FOLLOWED_BY: an ordered two-event correlation where event B occurs after event A within a fixed time window, correlated by entity. Equivalent to a two-step SEQUENCE.ALERT: emit a detection with the matched evidence.
Reconnaissance
| ATT&CK TTP | Basic algorithmic detection logic | Relevant log sources |
|---|---|---|
| T1595 Active Scanning · simulation · detections | COUNT(denied_or_failed_connections BY source_ip, 5m) >= threshold AND DISTINCT_COUNT(destination_port OR destination_host) >= threshold -> ALERT | Network Firewall Logs, Network Flow Logs, Network Intrusion Detection Logs |
| T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning · simulation · detections | MATCH(scanner_signature OR known_scanner_user_agent OR vulnerability_probe_path) AND source_ip NOT_IN approved_scanners -> ALERT | Web Application Firewall Logs, Web Server Access Logs, Network Intrusion Detection Logs |
| T1595.003 Wordlist Scanning · simulation · detections | COUNT(http_status IN [404, 403] BY source_ip, 5m) >= threshold AND DISTINCT_COUNT(uri_path) >= threshold -> ALERT | Web Server Access Logs, Web Application Firewall Logs, API Gateway Logs |
| T1590 Gather Victim Network Information · simulation · detections | MATCH(dns_zone_transfer_request OR repeated_public_dns_enumeration) AND source_ip NOT_IN approved_dns_admins -> ALERT | Authoritative DNS Logs, Network Intrusion Detection Logs |
Resource Development
Most resource-development TTPs occur outside defender-controlled systems and lack reliable deterministic internal detection. Detection generally begins when staged infrastructure or content interacts with the environment.
| ATT&CK TTP | Basic algorithmic detection logic | Relevant log sources |
|---|---|---|
| T1583 Acquire Infrastructure · simulation · detections | MATCH(domain OR certificate OR address IN threat_intelligence_denylist) -> ALERT | Threat-Intelligence Platform Logs, DNS Resolver Logs, TLS and Certificate Metadata Logs |
| T1608 Stage Capabilities · simulation · detections | MATCH(download_hash OR url OR sender IN known_malicious_indicators) -> ALERT | Proxy and Secure Web Gateway Logs, Email Gateway Logs, Content Inspection and Malware Scanning Logs |
Initial Access
Execution
| ATT&CK TTP | Basic algorithmic detection logic | Relevant log sources |
|---|---|---|
| T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter · simulation · detections | MATCH(process_name IN command_interpreters) AND command_line MATCHES suspicious_argument_patterns -> ALERT | Process Execution Logs, Command-Line and Shell History Logs, Script-Execution Logs |
| T1059.001 PowerShell · simulation · detections | MATCH(powershell_execution) AND command_or_script MATCHES [encoded_command, download_expression, hidden_window, execution_policy_bypass] -> ALERT | Windows PowerShell Logs, Process Execution Logs |
| T1059.003 Windows Command Shell · simulation · detections | MATCH(process_name IN [cmd.exe, command.com]) AND command_line MATCHES suspicious_command_patterns -> ALERT | Process Execution Logs, Windows Security Event Logs |
| T1059.004 Unix Shell · simulation · detections | MATCH(shell_execution) AND command_line MATCHES suspicious_command_patterns -> ALERT | Linux Audit Logs, Linux Shell History, Process Execution Logs |
| T1059.005 Visual Basic · simulation · detections | MATCH(process_name IN [cscript.exe, wscript.exe]) AND script_path NOT_IN approved_script_paths -> ALERT | Process Execution Logs, Script-Execution Logs |
| T1059.006 Python · simulation · detections | MATCH(python_execution) AND script_path OR parent_process NOT_IN approved_list -> ALERT | Process Execution Logs, Linux Audit Logs |
| T1059.007 JavaScript · simulation · detections | MATCH(script_host_execution) AND script_path IN temporary_or_user_writable_paths -> ALERT | Process Execution Logs, Script-Execution Logs |
| T1204 User Execution · simulation · detections | SEQUENCE(file_download_or_attachment_open, process_execution FROM downloaded_file) WITHIN 5m -> ALERT | File-System Activity Logs, Process Execution Logs, Email Gateway Logs |
| T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution · simulation · detections | MATCH(exploit_mitigation_block OR application_crash_signature) FOLLOWED_BY child_process_creation WITHIN 2m -> ALERT | Memory-Protection and Exploit-Mitigation Logs, Operating-System Crash and Diagnostic Logs, Process Execution Logs |
| T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution · simulation · detections | MATCH(process_name IN proxy_execution_binaries) AND command_line MATCHES known_abuse_patterns -> ALERT | Process Execution Logs, Application-Control Logs |
| T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation · simulation · detections | MATCH(wmi_process_or_remote_operation) AND caller_or_command NOT_IN approved_wmi_activity -> ALERT | Windows Remote Management Logs, Process Execution Logs, Windows Security Event Logs |
| T1053 Scheduled Task/Job · simulation · detections | MATCH(task_created_or_modified) AND task_action NOT_IN approved_task_actions -> ALERT | Scheduled Task and Job Logs, Windows Task Scheduler Logs |
| T1609 Container Administration Command · simulation · detections | MATCH(orchestrator_request_subresource = exec) AND actor NOT_IN approved_container_admins -> ALERT | Orchestrator Audit Logs, Container Runtime Logs |
Persistence
| ATT&CK TTP | Basic algorithmic detection logic | Relevant log sources |
|---|---|---|
| T1136 Create Account · simulation · detections | MATCH(account_created) AND creator NOT_IN approved_account_provisioners -> ALERT | Windows Security Event Logs, Directory-Service Audit Logs, Identity Provider Audit Logs |
| T1098 Account Manipulation · simulation · detections | MATCH(credential_added OR role_added OR group_membership_changed) AND actor NOT_IN approved_identity_admins -> ALERT | Directory-Service Audit Logs, Identity Provider Audit Logs, Cloud Identity and Access Management Logs |
| T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · simulation · detections | MATCH(registry_or_startup_path IN autostart_locations) AND executable NOT_IN approved_autostart_programs -> ALERT | Registry and Configuration-Store Logs, File-System Activity Logs |
| T1543 Create or Modify System Process · simulation · detections | MATCH(service_created_or_modified) AND service_binary NOT_IN approved_service_binaries -> ALERT | Service and Daemon Management Logs, Windows System Event Logs, Linux System Logs |
| T1053 Scheduled Task/Job · simulation · detections | MATCH(task_created_or_modified) AND creator NOT_IN approved_schedulers -> ALERT | Scheduled Task and Job Logs, Windows Task Scheduler Logs, Linux Service-Manager Logs |
| T1505.003 Web Shell · simulation · detections | MATCH(new_or_modified_file IN web_root) AND extension IN executable_server_extensions -> ALERT; SEQUENCE(web_request, web_server_child_process) WITHIN 1m -> ALERT | File-Integrity Monitoring Logs, Web Server Access Logs, Process Execution Logs |
| T1114.003 Email Forwarding Rule · simulation · detections | MATCH(forwarding_rule_created) AND destination_domain NOT_IN approved_domains -> ALERT | Mailbox Audit Logs, Application Audit Logs |
| T1610 Deploy Container · simulation · detections | MATCH(workload_created) AND (image NOT_IN approved_images OR privileged = true OR host_mount = true) -> ALERT | Orchestrator Audit Logs, Container Image Registry Logs, Container Admission-Control Logs |
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Historical grouping retained: the maintained research edition uses Enterprise ATT&CK v19.2 and explains the April 2026 split into Stealth and Defense Impairment. These catalog rows and old identifiers are preserved for compatibility, not asserted as current taxonomy. Version context.
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
| ATT&CK TTP | Basic algorithmic detection logic | Relevant log sources |
|---|---|---|
| T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol · simulation · detections | MATCH(successful_rdp_session) AND source_host NOT_IN approved_rdp_sources -> ALERT | Remote Desktop and Remote Support Logs, Windows Security Event Logs, Network Flow Logs |
| T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares · simulation · detections | MATCH(admin_share_access OR remote_service_creation) AND source_host NOT_IN approved_admin_hosts -> ALERT | Windows Security Event Logs, File-System Activity Logs, Network Flow Logs |
| T1021.004 SSH · simulation · detections | MATCH(successful_ssh_login) AND source_host NOT_IN approved_ssh_sources -> ALERT | Linux Authentication Logs, Network Flow Logs |
| T1021.006 Windows Remote Management · simulation · detections | MATCH(remote_management_session_or_command) AND source_host NOT_IN approved_management_hosts -> ALERT | Windows Remote Management Logs, Windows Security Event Logs |
| T1550.002 Pass the Hash · simulation · detections | MATCH(ntlm_network_logon_pattern_without_expected_interactive_context) AND source_host NOT_IN approved_admin_hosts -> ALERT | Windows Security Event Logs, Directory-Service Authentication Logs |
| T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer · simulation · detections | MATCH(file_written_to_remote_share_or_host) AND file_hash_or_extension IN monitored_types -> ALERT | File-System Activity Logs, File Transfer Service Logs, Network Flow Logs |
Collection
| ATT&CK TTP | Basic algorithmic detection logic | Relevant log sources |
|---|---|---|
| T1005 Data from Local System · simulation · detections | COUNT(reads_of_protected_files BY process_or_user, 10m) >= threshold -> ALERT | File-System Activity Logs, Storage-System Audit Logs |
| T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive · simulation · detections | COUNT(network_share_file_reads BY user, 10m) >= threshold -> ALERT | File-System Activity Logs, Storage-System Audit Logs, Network Flow Logs |
| T1114 Email Collection · simulation · detections | COUNT(message_read_or_export BY actor, 10m) >= threshold OR MATCH(mailbox_export_operation) -> ALERT | Mailbox Audit Logs, Application Audit Logs |
| T1213 Data from Information Repositories · simulation · detections | COUNT(repository_reads_or_exports BY actor, 10m) >= threshold OR MATCH(bulk_export_operation) -> ALERT | Database Audit Logs, Data Warehouse Audit Logs, Application Audit Logs |
| T1530 Data from Cloud Storage · simulation · detections | COUNT(object_read_or_list BY identity, 10m) >= threshold OR MATCH(snapshot_or_bucket_export) -> ALERT | Cloud Object-Storage Access Logs, Cloud Data-Plane Access Logs |
| T1119 Automated Collection · simulation · detections | COUNT(data_access_event BY actor, fixed_window) >= threshold AND process_or_identity NOT_IN approved_collectors -> ALERT | File-System Activity Logs, Database Audit Logs, Cloud Data-Plane Access Logs |
| T1074 Data Staged · simulation · detections | MATCH(archive_or_compression_process) AND output_path IN staging_paths -> ALERT; COUNT(files_created_in_staging_path, 10m) >= threshold -> ALERT | Process Execution Logs, File-System Activity Logs |
| T1113 Screen Capture · simulation · detections | MATCH(screen_capture_api_or_known_capture_tool) AND process NOT_IN approved_capture_apps -> ALERT | Endpoint Detection and Response Telemetry, Process Execution Logs |
Command and Control
| ATT&CK TTP | Basic algorithmic detection logic | Relevant log sources |
|---|---|---|
| T1071.001 Web Protocols · simulation · detections | MATCH(destination_or_url IN denylist OR http_signature IN known_c2_patterns) -> ALERT | Proxy and Secure Web Gateway Logs, Network Intrusion Detection Logs, Network Metadata Logs |
| T1071.004 DNS · simulation · detections | MATCH(dns_query_signature IN known_c2_patterns) OR COUNT(long_or_txt_queries BY source_host, 5m) >= threshold -> ALERT | DNS Resolver Logs, Packet-Capture Data, Network Detection and Response Telemetry |
| T1573 Encrypted Channel · simulation · detections | MATCH(certificate_fingerprint OR tls_fingerprint IN denylist) OR MATCH(disallowed_tls_version_or_cipher) -> ALERT | TLS and Certificate Metadata Logs, Network Metadata Logs |
| T1102 Web Service · simulation · detections | MATCH(connection_to_disallowed_web_service_category OR known_c2_account_or_url) -> ALERT | Proxy and Secure Web Gateway Logs, Collaboration Platform Audit Logs |
| T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer · simulation · detections | MATCH(download_hash_or_url IN denylist) OR SEQUENCE(network_download, executable_file_creation) WITHIN 2m -> ALERT | Proxy and Secure Web Gateway Logs, File-System Activity Logs, Content Inspection and Malware Scanning Logs |
| T1090 Proxy · simulation · detections | MATCH(proxy_or_tunnel_process_or_configuration) AND actor_or_binary NOT_IN approved_proxy_tools -> ALERT | Process Execution Logs, Network Configuration Change Logs, Network Flow Logs |
| T1572 Protocol Tunneling · simulation · detections | MATCH(tunneling_protocol_signature OR disallowed_protocol_over_allowed_port) -> ALERT | Packet-Capture Data, Network Intrusion Detection Logs, Network Metadata Logs |
Exfiltration
Impact
| ATT&CK TTP | Basic algorithmic detection logic | Relevant log sources |
|---|---|---|
| T1485 Data Destruction · simulation · detections | COUNT(delete_operation BY actor_or_process, 5m) >= threshold OR MATCH(delete_on_protected_resource) -> ALERT | File-System Activity Logs, Database Audit Logs, Cloud Object-Storage Access Logs |
| T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact · simulation · detections | COUNT(file_write_or_rename BY process, 5m) >= threshold AND DISTINCT_COUNT(file_extension BY process, 5m) >= threshold -> ALERTMATCH(known_ransomware_signature) -> ALERT | File-System Activity Logs, Endpoint Detection and Response Telemetry, Antivirus and Antimalware Logs |
| T1490 Inhibit System Recovery · simulation · detections | MATCH(backup_deleted OR snapshot_deleted OR recovery_setting_disabled OR known_recovery_disable_command) -> ALERT | Backup and Recovery Logs, Process Execution Logs, Cloud Control-Plane Audit Logs |
| T1531 Account Access Removal · simulation · detections | MATCH(account_disabled_or_deleted OR credential_reset OR role_removed) AND actor NOT_IN approved_identity_admins -> ALERT | Identity Provider Audit Logs, Directory-Service Audit Logs, Cloud Identity and Access Management Logs |
| T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service · simulation · detections | COUNT(request_or_connection BY source, 1m) >= threshold AND service_error_or_unavailable = true -> ALERT | Network Firewall Logs, Web Server Access Logs, Metrics and Monitoring-System Logs |
| T1496 Resource Hijacking · simulation · detections | MATCH(known_mining_process_or_pool_destination) OR resource_usage >= fixed_threshold FOR fixed_duration -> ALERT | Process Execution Logs, Network Flow Logs, Metrics and Monitoring-System Logs, Cloud Billing and Usage Logs |
| T1565 Data Manipulation · simulation · detections | MATCH(update_or_delete_on_protected_record) AND actor NOT_IN approved_writers -> ALERT | Database Audit Logs, Application Audit Logs, File-Integrity Monitoring Logs |
Deterministic Detection Limitations
- Fixed thresholds require environment-specific tuning and can be evaded by reducing activity rate.
- Signatures and denylists detect known patterns but do not reliably detect novel implementations.
- Allowlists reduce noise but become unsafe when they are broad, stale, or poorly governed.
- Deterministic correlations require reliable timestamps and stable entity identifiers.
- Some ATT&CK TTPs occur outside the monitored environment or produce no reliable deterministic event.
- A matched rule indicates observable behavior, not confirmed malicious intent.
MITRE ATT&CK References
Connected attack and detection workspaces
Attack Tools · Attack Simulations · Detection Rules · Telemetry Library · Linked Tags
These links follow exact active technique IDs or the published model's taxonomy references. They are navigation context, not proof of live simulation, sensor equivalence or detection effectiveness. Retired IDs are not silently migrated.
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1003.006 DCSync detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1005 Data from Local System detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1021.004 SSH detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1021.006 Windows Remote Management detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1036 Masquerading detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1046 Network Service Discovery detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1055 Process Injection detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1057 Process Discovery detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1059.001 PowerShell detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1059.003 Windows Command Shell detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1059.004 Unix Shell detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1059.005 Visual Basic detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1059.006 Python detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1059.007 JavaScript detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1069 Permission Groups Discovery detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1070.004 File Deletion detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1070.006 Timestomp detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1071.001 Web Protocols detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1071.004 DNS detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1074 Data Staged detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1078 Valid Accounts detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1087 Account Discovery detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1090 Proxy detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1098 Account Manipulation detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1102 Web Service detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1110.001 Password Guessing detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1110.003 Password Spraying detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1110.004 Credential Stuffing detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1113 Screen Capture detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1114 Email Collection detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1114.003 Email Forwarding Rule detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1119 Automated Collection detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1133 External Remote Services detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1134 Access Token Manipulation detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1136 Create Account detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1204 User Execution detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1485 Data Destruction detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1496 Resource Hijacking detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1505.003 Web Shell detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1518 Software Discovery detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1518.001 Security Software Discovery detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1531 Account Access Removal detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1543 Create or Modify System Process detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1548.001 Setuid and Setgid detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1550.002 Pass the Hash detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1558.003 Kerberoasting detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1565 Data Manipulation detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1573 Encrypted Channel detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1590 Gather Victim Network Information detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1595 Active Scanning detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1595.003 Wordlist Scanning detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1608 Stage Capabilities detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1609 Container Administration Command detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1610 Deploy Container detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1611 Escape to Host detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1613 Container and Resource Discovery detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID
- T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation detections — Exact published Atlas technique ID