1200KM / sigma-rule
Unusual File Deletion by Dns.exe — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 8f0b1fb1-9bd4-4e74-8cdf-a8de4d2adfd0. Unusual File Deletion by Dns.exe — Sigma Rule. Detects an unexpected file being deleted by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-09-27 / 2023-02-15.
{
"category": "file_delete",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 94256741ead5b1c08b6f95d093a0320bc6d98d33e318d87f040c5932305779db
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Unusual File Deletion by Dns.exe
id: 8f0b1fb1-9bd4-4e74-8cdf-a8de4d2adfd0
related:
- id: 9f383dc0-fdeb-4d56-acbc-9f9f4f8f20f3 # FileChange version
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects an unexpected file being deleted by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-file-modification-by-dns-exe.html
author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
date: 2022-09-27
modified: 2023-02-15
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1133
logsource:
category: file_delete
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\dns.exe'
filter:
TargetFilename|endswith: '\dns.log'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.