1200KM / telemetry
Drive Creation — Detection Telemetry
Appearance or creation of a drive/device mapping on a host.
Collection and providers
Collect OS device/mount events plus read-only volume inventory; distinguish physical attachment, partition creation and logical mapping.
- osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
- Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
Configuration
- Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
- Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
- Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0042",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"device_id": "lab-disk-2",
"mount_point": "/mnt/lab",
"action": "attach"
}
}Visibility and validation
Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
- T1025 · Data from Removable Media · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1052 · Exfiltration Over Physical Medium · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1052.001 · Exfiltration over USB · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1091 · Replication Through Removable Media · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1092 · Communication Through Removable Media · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1200 · Hardware Additions · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1219.003 · Remote Access Hardware · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1674 · Input Injection · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0847 · Replication Through Removable Media · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0895 · Autorun Image · Detection rules & anomalies
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Native security log sources
Security log-source library groups concrete producers and formats separately from ATT&CK data components. Samples carry provenance and version limits; associations do not prove collection coverage.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.