1200KM / simulation
Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the…
Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system.[ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014] Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.
Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
DC0042 collection page — Collect OS device/mount events plus read-only volume inventory; distinguish physical attachment, partition creation and logical mapping.
Required normalized fields: device_id, mount_point, action.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0042",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"device_id": "lab-disk-2",
"mount_point": "/mnt/lab",
"action": "attach"
}
}Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.
DC0039 collection page — Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.
Required normalized fields: process_id, path, action, size_bytes.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0039",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_id": 4200,
"path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
"action": "create",
"size_bytes": 64
}
}Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.
<EventFiltering>
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
</ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0032",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
"parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"command_line": "whoami",
"user": "LAB\\analyst"
}
}Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering
Behavioral sequence where removable media is mounted, files are written/updated, and subsequently read/executed on a separate host, suggesting removable-media relay communication.
Platforms: Windows.
Detection of file write-access to USB-mount directories (e.g., /media/, /run/media/) followed by same-file access or execution on another host.
Platforms: Linux.
Correlates removable volume mounts (disk arbitration) with file I/O events on that volume, followed by same file execution shortly after insert.
Platforms: macOS.
No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.
No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1092 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.
Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.
Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots
No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.
These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.
Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines, using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.[FireEye APT28][ESET Sednit Part 2][Microsoft SIR Vol 19]
Exact relationship: relationship--167d7b11-01f3-42d5-bb8a-78306dc80243USBStealer drops commands for a second victim onto a removable media drive inserted into the first victim, and commands are executed when the drive is inserted into the second victim.[ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014]
Exact relationship: relationship--c612eb88-d7e0-46cc-a9bc-d0da2977ff00Atomic evidence: no compatible candidate in this snapshot. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.
Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.
No compatible Atomic procedure is present in this pinned evidence set. Technical feasibility has not been ruled out. A custom procedure must define the behavior, target, collection point, success observable and rollback before execution.
Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook
This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Communication Through Removable Media, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.
Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.
All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook
Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.
Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[TechNet Removable Media Control]
Disable Autoruns if it is unnecessary.[Microsoft Disable Autorun]
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.