1200KM / detection
T1091 Replication Through Removable Media — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1091 Replication Through Removable Media: 1 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device Was Recognized By The System · test · low · {"product":"windows","service":"security"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0301 Removable Media Execution Chain Detection via File and Process Activity
AN0841 Analytic 0841
Execution of files originating from removable media after drive mount, with correlation to file write activity, autorun usage, or lateral spread via staged tools.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Complete technique engineering workbook
Collection configuration and event examples · Anomaly models and design worksheet · Tools and documented software · Simulation procedures · Offline synthetic collection check
Exact source tags are not semantic relevance verdicts. Review actual rule conditions and observation points; imported rules are not backend-compiled or live-validated.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.