T1025 Data from Removable Media — Attack Simulation

DC0042 collection page — Collect OS device/mount events plus read-only volume inventory; distinguish physical attachment, partition creation and logical mapping.

Providers and collection configuration

• osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
• Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.

• Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
• Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
• Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.

Required normalized fields: device_id, mount_point, action.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0042",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "device_id": "lab-disk-2",
    "mount_point": "/mnt/lab",
    "action": "attach"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.

DC0055 collection page — Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.

Providers and collection configuration

• Windows Security auditing: Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.

• Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
• For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
• Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: path, access, actor, result.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0055",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "access": "read",
    "actor": "LAB\\analyst",
    "result": "success"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

• Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
• Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
• Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.

• On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
• Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
• For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

MITRE detection strategy

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

• S0036 FLASHFLOOD — malware.

  FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on removable media and copies them to a staging area. The default file types copied would include data copied to the drive by SPACESHIP.[FireEye APT30]

  Exact relationship: relationship--e30a790b-8f09-4bdc-8116-275d00880333
• S0050 CosmicDuke — malware.

  CosmicDuke steals user files from removable media with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.[F-Secure Cosmicduke]

  Exact relationship: relationship--ff61ebde-befe-488a-89d0-dc4c49e60d59
• S0090 Rover — malware.

  Rover searches for files on attached removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions every five seconds.[Palo Alto Rover]

  Exact relationship: relationship--6d87588e-2202-4616-a536-e43a2606721b
• S0113 Prikormka — malware.

  Prikormka contains a module that collects documents with certain extensions from removable media or fixed drives connected via USB.[ESET Operation Groundbait]

  Exact relationship: relationship--96e928af-dbfc-4743-a1dc-353904e21fd3
• S0115 Crimson — malware.

  Crimson contains a module to collect data from removable drives.[Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016][Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020]

  Exact relationship: relationship--9ab576ed-2ba0-4fc5-87fc-2011a7cd183d
• S0125 Remsec — malware.

  Remsec has a package that collects documents from any inserted USB sticks.[Kaspersky ProjectSauron Technical Analysis]

  Exact relationship: relationship--8e7ff07b-7a32-4ced-ac22-b523586dbde3
• S0128 BADNEWS — malware.

  BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to a predefined directory.[TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017]

  Exact relationship: relationship--93fc3086-d2c0-4b4d-8a69-278f15176739
• S0136 USBStealer — malware.

  Once a removable media device is inserted back into the first victim, USBStealer collects data from it that was exfiltrated from a second victim.[ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014][Kaspersky Sofacy]

  Exact relationship: relationship--00ae99d1-db02-4007-8669-04d7fc4c1390
• S0237 GravityRAT — malware.

  GravityRAT steals files based on an extension list if a USB drive is connected to the system.[Talos GravityRAT]

  Exact relationship: relationship--565da748-a5c8-417c-8c55-828c6e9f2c35
• S0260 InvisiMole — malware.

  InvisiMole can collect jpeg files from connected MTP devices.[ESET InvisiMole June 2020]

  Exact relationship: relationship--077beadb-aa94-45bd-8875-d917fcd7f6b7
• S0409 Machete — malware.

  Machete can find, encrypt, and upload files from fixed and removable drives.[Cylance Machete Mar 2017][ESET Machete July 2019]

  Exact relationship: relationship--9cba53fd-9b5c-4dc3-b933-c167b1d62a03
• S0456 Aria-body — malware.

  Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices.[CheckPoint Naikon May 2020]

  Exact relationship: relationship--2995ea85-ccdb-4378-bc35-3c62ccf5fa9d
• S0458 Ramsay — malware.

  Ramsay can collect data from removable media and stage it for exfiltration.[Eset Ramsay May 2020]

  Exact relationship: relationship--f86c19e6-39a1-423c-8db2-a8258ac51bd6
• S0467 TajMahal — malware.

  TajMahal has the ability to steal written CD images and files of interest from previously connected removable drives when they become available again.[Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019]

  Exact relationship: relationship--cad9bdcc-41b3-44e2-98d2-fb07fe268838
• S0538 Crutch — malware.

  Crutch can monitor removable drives and exfiltrate files matching a given extension list.[ESET Crutch December 2020]

  Exact relationship: relationship--97cfa5ec-e6b6-40cc-b73c-283f4a5d8ded
• S0569 Explosive — malware.

  Explosive can scan all .exe files located in the USB drive.[CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015]

  Exact relationship: relationship--50b2e4e3-8740-463b-87fc-e96c4b62fbe5
• S0622 AppleSeed — malware.

  AppleSeed can find and collect data from removable media devices.[Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021][KISA Operation Muzabi]

  Exact relationship: relationship--e465cb38-ba50-4d2d-b2cd-659742815317
• S0644 ObliqueRAT — malware.

  ObliqueRAT has the ability to extract data from removable devices connected to the endpoint.[Talos Oblique RAT March 2021]

  Exact relationship: relationship--ab3599ae-66cd-49c2-bfa7-cbec9af6e271
• S1044 FunnyDream — malware.

  The FunnyDream FilePakMonitor component has the ability to collect files from removable devices.[Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020]

  Exact relationship: relationship--e6e4cb23-3c58-41d8-9583-9e10bff2b1d0
• S1146 MgBot — malware.

  MgBot includes modules capable of gathering information from USB thumb drives and CD-ROMs on the victim machine given a list of provided criteria.[ESET EvasivePanda 2023]

  Exact relationship: relationship--74e09d88-36e4-4332-9a25-3d5f19db1bfb

This test simulates an attack where PowerShell is used to detect connected USB or other removable storage devices and gather a list of specific document files
(e.g., .docx, .xls, .txt, .pdf). The command works by first identifying removable drives on the system and then recursively searching through each one for files
matching the targeted extensions. If no removable drives are present, the script will return a message stating that no media is detected. This behavior mimics
how adversaries might scan for sensitive documents on removable devices for exfiltration or analysis.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 0b29f7e3-a050-44b7-bf05-9fb86af1ec2e · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

• M1057 Data Loss Prevention

  Data loss prevention can restrict access to sensitive data and detect sensitive data that is unencrypted.