1200KM / detection
T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB: 0 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0220 Detection of USB-Based Data Exfiltration
AN0616 Analytic 0616
Detects USB device insertion followed by high-volume or sensitive file access and staging activity by suspicious processes or accounts.
AN0617 Analytic 0617
Detects USB block device mount followed by file access in sensitive directories or high-volume copy operations by user-controlled processes.
AN0618 Analytic 0618
Detects external volume mount with Finder, Terminal, or script-initiated file copy from user profiles, sensitive folders, or cloud storage sync directories to USB.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
T1052.001 simulation workspace
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.