1200KM / detection
T1025 Data from Removable Media — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1025 Data from Removable Media: 0 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0511 Detection of Data Access and Collection from Removable Media
AN1410 Analytic 1410
Adversary mounts a USB device and begins enumerating, copying, or compressing files using scripting engines, cmd, or remote access tools.
AN1411 Analytic 1411
Adversary mounts external drive to /media or /mnt then accesses or copies targeted data via shell, cp, or tar.
AN1412 Analytic 1412
Adversary attaches USB drive and accesses sensitive files using Finder, cp, or bash scripts.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Complete technique engineering workbook
Collection configuration and event examples · Anomaly models and design worksheet · Tools and documented software · Simulation procedures · Offline synthetic collection check
Exact source tags are not semantic relevance verdicts. Review actual rule conditions and observation points; imported rules are not backend-compiled or live-validated.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.