1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH
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T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment — Detection Rules

Detection workspace for T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment: 19 Sigma sources, 1 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.

Source-backed rule directory

Atlas deterministic concepts

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

MATCH(attachment_extension IN blocked_types OR attachment_hash IN denylist OR sandbox_verdict = malicious) -> ALERT

Anomaly models

No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.

ATT&CK analytic guidance

DET0236 Detection Strategy for Spearphishing Attachment across OS Platforms

AN0655 Analytic 0655

Detection of spearphishing attachments by correlating suspicious email delivery with subsequent file creation and abnormal process execution (e.g., Office spawning PowerShell or CMD). Behavior chain includes inbound email metadata → attachment stored on disk → process execution → outbound network activity.

AN0656 Analytic 0656

Phishing attachments executed on Linux systems are detected by linking email logs to file creation in mail directories and subsequent suspicious process execution. Look for unexpected binaries or scripts spawned from user mail directories and anomalous outbound network activity.

AN0657 Analytic 0657

Phishing attachment detection on macOS through correlation of Mail app logs, file creation in user directories, and abnormal process execution (e.g., Preview.app or Mail.app spawning Terminal or scripting binaries). Network traffic after attachment interaction is also monitored.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Simulation, tools and telemetry

T1566.001 simulation workspace

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing anomaly research

Original publication snapshot · Anomaly Detection Atlas

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.