1200KM / detection
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment: 19 Sigma sources, 1 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Suspicious Email Delivered In Microsoft 365 · experimental · medium · {"service":"audit","product":"m365"}
- Disk Image Mounting Via Hdiutil - MacOS · test · medium · {"product":"macos","category":"process_creation"}
- ISO Image Mounted · test · medium · {"product":"windows","service":"security","definition":"The advanced audit policy setting \"Object Access > Audit Removable Storage\" must be configured for Success/Failure"}
- Password Protected ZIP File Opened (Email Attachment) · test · high · {"product":"windows","service":"security"}
- Potential Initial Access via DLL Search Order Hijacking · test · medium · {"product":"windows","category":"file_event"}
- ISO File Created Within Temp Folders · test · high · {"category":"file_event","product":"windows"}
- ISO or Image Mount Indicator in Recent Files · test · medium · {"product":"windows","category":"file_event"}
- Office Macro File Creation · test · low · {"category":"file_event","product":"windows"}
- Office Macro File Download · test · low · {"category":"file_event","product":"windows"}
- Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process · test · high · {"category":"file_event","product":"windows","definition":"Requirements: The \"ParentImage\" field is not available by default on EID 11 of Sysmon logs. To be able to use this rule to the full extent you need to enriche the log with additional ParentImage data"}
- Suspicious File Created in Outlook Temporary Directory · experimental · high · {"product":"windows","category":"file_event"}
- HTML Help HH.EXE Suspicious Child Process · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- Suspicious HH.EXE Execution · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- Suspicious HWP Sub Processes · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- Suspicious Microsoft OneNote Child Process · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- Suspicious Execution From Outlook Temporary Folder · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- Arbitrary Shell Command Execution Via Settingcontent-Ms · test · medium · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- Suspicious Double Extension File Execution · stable · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- Windows Registry Trust Record Modification · test · medium · {"category":"registry_event","product":"windows"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
MATCH(attachment_extension IN blocked_types OR attachment_hash IN denylist OR sandbox_verdict = malicious) -> ALERTAnomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0236 Detection Strategy for Spearphishing Attachment across OS Platforms
AN0655 Analytic 0655
Detection of spearphishing attachments by correlating suspicious email delivery with subsequent file creation and abnormal process execution (e.g., Office spawning PowerShell or CMD). Behavior chain includes inbound email metadata → attachment stored on disk → process execution → outbound network activity.
AN0656 Analytic 0656
Phishing attachments executed on Linux systems are detected by linking email logs to file creation in mail directories and subsequent suspicious process execution. Look for unexpected binaries or scripts spawned from user mail directories and anomalous outbound network activity.
AN0657 Analytic 0657
Phishing attachment detection on macOS through correlation of Mail app logs, file creation in user directories, and abnormal process execution (e.g., Preview.app or Mail.app spawning Terminal or scripting binaries). Network traffic after attachment interaction is also monitored.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
- APT12 · G0005
- APT1 · G0006
- APT28 · G0007
- Darkhotel · G0012
- APT30 · G0013
- APT29 · G0016
- admin@338 · G0018
- Naikon · G0019
- Molerats · G0021
- Threat Group-3390 · G0027
- Lazarus Group · G0032
- Sandworm Team · G0034
- Dragonfly · G0035
- FIN6 · G0037
- Patchwork · G0040
- menuPass · G0045
- FIN7 · G0046
- Gamaredon Group · G0047
- RTM · G0048
- OilRig · G0049
- APT32 · G0050
- BRONZE BUTLER · G0060
- FIN8 · G0061
- TA459 · G0062
- APT33 · G0064
- Leviathan · G0065
- Elderwood · G0066
- APT37 · G0067
- PLATINUM · G0068
- MuddyWater · G0069
- APT19 · G0073
- Rancor · G0075
- Gorgon Group · G0078
- DarkHydrus · G0079
- Cobalt Group · G0080
- Tropic Trooper · G0081
- APT38 · G0082
- Gallmaker · G0084
- FIN4 · G0085
- APT39 · G0087
- The White Company · G0089
- WIRTE · G0090
- Silence · G0091
- TA505 · G0092
- Kimsuky · G0094
- Machete · G0095
- APT41 · G0096
- BlackTech · G0098
- APT-C-36 · G0099
- Inception · G0100
- Wizard Spider · G0102
- Mofang · G0103
- Windshift · G0112
- Sidewinder · G0121
- Higaisa · G0126
- TA551 · G0127
- Mustang Panda · G0129
- Ajax Security Team · G0130
- Tonto Team · G0131
- Nomadic Octopus · G0133
- Transparent Tribe · G0134
- IndigoZebra · G0136
- Ferocious Kitten · G0137
- Andariel · G0138
- LazyScripter · G0140
- Confucius · G0142
- BITTER · G1002
- SideCopy · G1008
- EXOTIC LILY · G1011
- CURIUM · G1012
- TA2541 · G1018
- Malteiro · G1026
- Saint Bear · G1031
- Star Blizzard · G1033
- Winter Vivern · G1035
- Moonstone Sleet · G1036
- RedCurl · G1039
- MirrorFace · G1054
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.