1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious HH.EXE Execution — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule e8a95b5e-c891-46e2-b33a-93937d3abc31. Suspicious HH.EXE Execution — Sigma Rule. Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Maxim Pavlunin. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2020-04-01 / 2023-04-12.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: f231c06adee451e0d209b7cbc603fbd8cabc0265f0323fbd9d2d34eafa37dcb6
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious HH.EXE Execution
id: e8a95b5e-c891-46e2-b33a-93937d3abc31
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
references:
- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
- https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
author: Maxim Pavlunin
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.007
- attack.t1218
- attack.t1218.001
- attack.t1218.010
- attack.t1218.011
- attack.t1566
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: 'HH.exe'
- Image|endswith: '\hh.exe'
selection_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.application'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- '\Content.Outlook\'
- '\Downloads\'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\Windows\Temp\'
# - '\AppData\Local\Temp\Temp?_'
# - '\AppData\Local\Temp\Rar$'
# - '\AppData\Local\Temp\7z'
# - '\AppData\Local\Temp\wz'
# - '\AppData\Local\Temp\peazip-tmp'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
- https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
- T1047 · Windows Management Instrumentation · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.001 · PowerShell · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.003 · Windows Command Shell · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.005 · Visual Basic · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.007 · JavaScript · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1218 · System Binary Proxy Execution · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1218.001 · Compiled HTML File · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1218.010 · Regsvr32 · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1218.011 · Rundll32 · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1566 · Phishing · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1566.001 · Spearphishing Attachment · Detection rules & anomalies
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.