1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious File Created in Outlook Temporary Directory — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule fabb0e80-030c-4e3e-a104-d09676991ac3. Suspicious File Created in Outlook Temporary Directory — Sigma Rule. Detects the creation of files with suspicious file extensions in the temporary directory that Outlook uses when opening attachments. This can be used to detect spear-phishing campaigns that use suspicious files as attachments, which may contain malicious code.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2025-07-22 / not supplied.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "file_event"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: e3ffc5b745d0132f7f8665414ff6ea3e4f2f3d9e099d86ce947d1e7aa4467371
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious File Created in Outlook Temporary Directory
id: fabb0e80-030c-4e3e-a104-d09676991ac3
related:
- id: f748c45a-f8d3-4e6f-b617-fe176f695b8f
type: obsolete
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the creation of files with suspicious file extensions in the temporary directory that Outlook uses when opening attachments.
This can be used to detect spear-phishing campaigns that use suspicious files as attachments, which may contain malicious code.
references:
- https://vipre.com/blog/svg-phishing-attacks-the-new-trick-in-the-cybercriminals-playbook/
- https://thecyberexpress.com/rogue-rdp-files-used-in-ukraine-cyberattacks/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/29/midnight-blizzard-conducts-large-scale-spear-phishing-campaign-using-rdp-files/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-22
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection_extension:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.cpl'
- '.hta'
- '.iso'
- '.rdp'
- '.svg'
- '.vba'
- '.vbe'
- '.vbs'
selection_location:
- TargetFilename|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Outlook_'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Olk\Attachments\'
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\'
- '\Content.Outlook\'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Opening of headers or footers in email signatures that include SVG images or legitimate SVG attachments
level: high
False positives
- Opening of headers or footers in email signatures that include SVG images or legitimate SVG attachments
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.