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T1036 Masquerading — Detection Rules

Detection workspace for T1036 Masquerading: 38 Sigma sources, 1 Atlas concepts and 1 anomaly models. No live detection validation.

Source-backed rule directory

Atlas deterministic concepts

T1036 Masquerading

MATCH(filename_or_service_name IN trusted_names) AND hash_or_path_or_publisher NOT_IN approved_values -> ALERT

Anomaly models

ATT&CK analytic guidance

DET0127 Behavioral Detection of Masquerading Across Platforms via Metadata and Execution Discrepancy

AN0355 Analytic 0355

Adversary renames LOLBINs or deploys binaries with spoofed file names, internal PE metadata, or misleading icons to appear legitimate. File creation is followed by execution or service registration inconsistent with known usage.

AN0356 Analytic 0356

Adversary drops renamed binaries in uncommon directories (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm) or uses special characters in names (e.g., trailing space, Unicode RLO). Execution or cronjob registration follows shortly after file drop.

AN0357 Analytic 0357

Adversary creates disguised launch daemons or apps with misleading names and bundle metadata (e.g., Info.plist values inconsistent with binary path or icon). Launch is correlated with user logon or persistence setup.

AN0358 Analytic 0358

Adversary uses renamed container images, injects files into containers with misleading names or metadata (e.g., renamed system binaries), and executes them during startup or scheduled jobs.

AN0359 Analytic 0359

Adversary places scripts or binaries with misleading names in /etc/rc.local.d or /var/spool/cron, or registers services with legitimate-sounding names not present in default ESXi builds.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Simulation, tools and telemetry

T1036 simulation workspace

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing anomaly research

Original publication snapshot · Anomaly Detection Atlas

Connected anomaly research

Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.

Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.