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Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 5afee48e-67dd-4e03-a783-f74259dcf998. Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump — Sigma Rule. Detects potential credential harvesting attempts through LSASS memory dumps using ProcDump. This rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns that combine memory dump flags (-ma, -mm, -mp) with LSASS-related process markers. LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) contains sensitive authentication data including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets in memory. Attackers commonly dump LSASS memory to extract credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems). Source status: stable; severity: high. Source dates: 2018-10-30 / 2025-10-19.

{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: f75c2b4c77d1eda036e2b287816b7048b70544199fc0ef2a0418619586bc6d10

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Potential LSASS Process Dump Via Procdump
id: 5afee48e-67dd-4e03-a783-f74259dcf998
status: stable
description: |
    Detects potential credential harvesting attempts through LSASS memory dumps using ProcDump.
    This rule identifies suspicious command-line patterns that combine memory dump flags (-ma, -mm, -mp) with LSASS-related process markers.
    LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) contains sensitive authentication data including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets in memory.
    Attackers commonly dump LSASS memory to extract credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/3742ebfe-64c2-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
    - https://x.com/wietze/status/1958302556033065292?s=12
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-10-30
modified: 2025-10-19
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - car.2013-05-009
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_flags:
        CommandLine|contains|windash:
            - ' -ma '
            - ' -mm ' # Mini dump
            - ' -mp ' # Miniplus dump
    selection_process:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' ls' # Short for lsass
            - ' keyiso'
            - ' samss'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely, because no one should dump an lsass process memory
    - Another tool that uses command line flags similar to ProcDump
level: high

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unlikely, because no one should dump an lsass process memory
  • Another tool that uses command line flags similar to ProcDump

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.