1200KM / telemetry
Service Metadata — Detection Telemetry
Service configuration and current state at observation time.
Collection and providers
Inventory service name, executable, startup mode, owner and status using supported OS APIs; compare successive snapshots.
- osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
- Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
Configuration
- Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
- Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
- Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0041",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"service": "LabService",
"executable": "C:\\Lab\\service.exe",
"start_mode": "manual",
"state": "stopped"
}
}Visibility and validation
Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
- T1021.006 · Windows Remote Management · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1036 · Masquerading · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1036.004 · Masquerade Task or Service · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1036.005 · Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1037 · Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1489 · Service Stop · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1490 · Inhibit System Recovery · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1547 · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1574 · Hijack Execution Flow · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1685 · Disable or Modify Tools · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1685.001 · Disable or Modify Windows Event Log · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1685.004 · Disable or Modify Linux Audit System Log · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1687 · Exploitation for Defense Impairment · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0881 · Service Stop · Detection rules & anomalies
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.