1200KM / sigma-rule
Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 646ea171-dded-4578-8a4d-65e9822892e3. Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL — Sigma Rule. Detects a process memory dump via "comsvcs.dll" using rundll32, covering multiple different techniques (ordinal, minidump function, etc.)
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Modexp, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2020-02-18 / 2025-02-23.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 9859aead00dd5cb94933434be60a0727f436fcc6886bf00fde69440f5a3e483f
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Process Memory Dump Via Comsvcs.DLL
id: 646ea171-dded-4578-8a4d-65e9822892e3
related:
- id: 09e6d5c0-05b8-4ff8-9eeb-043046ec774c
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects a process memory dump via "comsvcs.dll" using rundll32, covering multiple different techniques (ordinal, minidump function, etc.)
references:
- https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484
- https://twitter.com/pythonresponder/status/1385064506049630211?s=21
- https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769
- https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
- https://twitter.com/Wietze/status/1542107456507203586
- https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy/blob/14d8f8ae596ecf22b449bfe919829173b8a07635/lsassy/dumpmethod/comsvcs.py
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Modexp, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2020-02-18
modified: 2025-02-23
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
- attack.t1003.001
- car.2013-05-009
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
- CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32'
selection_cli_1:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'comsvcs'
- 'full'
CommandLine|contains:
- '#-'
- '#+'
- '#24'
- '24 '
- 'MiniDump' # Matches MiniDump and MinidumpW
- '#65560' # ordinal is 16 bit ordinal, so if you make the number large enough (don't fit in 16 bit space), then it normally wraps around. for e.g ordinal 24 can be also represented by 65560 (65536+24)
selection_generic:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '24'
- 'comsvcs'
- 'full'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' #'
- ',#'
- ', #'
- '"#'
condition: (selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_*) or selection_generic
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
False positives
- Unlikely
Source references
- https://twitter.com/shantanukhande/status/1229348874298388484
- https://twitter.com/pythonresponder/status/1385064506049630211?s=21
- https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769
- https://modexp.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/minidumpwritedump-via-com-services-dll/
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1167417096374050817
- https://twitter.com/Wietze/status/1542107456507203586
- https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy/blob/14d8f8ae596ecf22b449bfe919829173b8a07635/lsassy/dumpmethod/comsvcs.py
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.