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This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.

Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.

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G1009 · 12 ATT&CK techniques · 0 correlated reports

Moses Staff

Aliases: DEV-0500, Marigold Sandstorm, Moses Staff

[Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand.(Citation: Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021) Security researchers assess [Moses Staff](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1009) is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility companies outside of Israel as well, including those in Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, the UAE, and the US.(Citation: Cybereason StrifeWater Feb 2022)

Open interactive actor investigation

ATT&CK techniques

T1016T1021.002T1027.013T1082T1087.001T1105T1190T1505.003T1553.002T1587.001T1588.002T1686.003

Correlated CTI and IR reports

Continue the investigation

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Attack tools, simulations and detection rules

Follow explicit source relationships into the reference modules. Linked procedures and detectors are not claims of live validation or actor attribution.

PsExec tool reference — Explicit actor uses software relationship in pinned ATT&CK
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1016 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1021.002 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1027.013 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1082 System Information Discovery simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1082 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1087.001 Local Account simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1087.001 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1105 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1190 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1505.003 Web Shell simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1505.003 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1553.002 Code Signing simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1553.002 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1587.001 Malware simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1587.001 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1588.002 Tool simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1588.002 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage
T1686.003 Windows Host Firewall simulation — Exact active technique ID
T1686.003 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage

Cyber Knowledge routes

These contextual routes explain behaviors associated with this ATT&CK group record. They support learning and investigation planning; they do not add attribution evidence.