Ingress Tool Transfer
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer). On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as `copy`, `finger`, certutil, and PowerShell commands such as IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString() and Invoke-WebRequest. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`. Adversaries may also abuse installers and package managers, such as `yum` or `winget`, to download tools to victim hosts. Adversaries have also abused file application features, such as the Windows `search-ms` protocol handler, to deliver malicious files to victims through remote file searches invoked by User Execution (typically after interacting with Phishing lures). Files can also be transferred using various Web Services as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system. In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage services that sync between a web-based and an on-premises client, such as Dropbox or OneDrive, to transfer files onto victim systems. For example, by compromising a cloud account and logging into the service's web portal, an adversary may be able to trigger an automatic syncing process that transfers the file onto the victim's machine.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as ftp, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Specifically, for the finger utility on Windows and Linux systems, monitor command line or terminal execution for the finger command. Monitor network activity for TCP port 79, which is used by the finger utility, and Windows netsh interface portproxy modifications to well-known ports such as 80 and 443. Furthermore, monitor file system for the download/creation and execution of suspicious files, which may indicate adversary-downloaded payloads. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.
Observed actors
G0082Indrik Spider
G0119Elderwood
G0066SideCopy
G1008GALLIUM
G0093APT3
G0022Mustard Tempest
G1020Kimsuky
G0094Volt Typhoon
G1017Patchwork
G0040APT41
G0096Dragonfly
G0035Evilnum
G0120Gorgon Group
G0078menuPass
G0045APT32
G0050HAFNIUM
G0125MuddyWater
G0069Gamaredon Group
G0047TeamTNT
G0139FIN7
G0046Sandworm Team
G0034APT18
G0026Andariel
G0138Sidewinder
G0121Mustang Panda
G0129ZIRCONIUM
G0128Rocke
G0106APT39
G0087TA2541
G1018APT37
G0067Moses Staff
G1009OilRig
G0049Tropic Trooper
G0081Aquatic Panda
G0143Ke3chang
G0004Confucius
G0142Leviathan
G0065Winter Vivern
G1035Turla
G0010TA505
G0092BITTER
G1002APT29
G0016Cinnamon Tempest
G1021Chimera
G0114BRONZE BUTLER
G0060TA551
G0127BackdoorDiplomacy
G0135Darkhotel
G0012Ember Bear
G1003LazyScripter
G0140Windshift
G0112Volatile Cedar
G0123Whitefly
G0107LuminousMoth
G1014APT28
G0007Metador
G1013Fox Kitten
G0117APT-C-36
G0099Winnti Group
G0044Tonto Team
G0131Lazarus Group
G0032INC Ransom
G1032Silence
G0091Cobalt Group
G0080Wizard Spider
G0102Molerats
G0021IndigoZebra
G0136Moonstone Sleet
G1036Play
G1040HEXANE
G1001Daggerfly
G1034Rancor
G0075WIRTE
G0090PLATINUM
G0068Magic Hound
G0059Ajax Security Team
G0130Threat Group-3390
G0027APT33
G0064FIN8
G0061FIN13
G1016Nomadic Octopus
G0133
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Unit 42 · direct source mappingUNC1860 and the Temple of Oats: Iran's Hidden Hand in Middle Eastern Networks
Google Cloud / Mandiant · direct source mappingAPT39 (Chafer / Remix Kitten)
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionAPT41 Targeting Pharmaceutical Sector: Log4Shell to Domain Compromise
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionATT&CK as a Working Tool: Theory and Hands-On Practical Usage
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionAttack Playbook — Operation DragonRx
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: Handala Hack Group (aka Handala Hack Team)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: Handala Hack Group (aka Handala Hack Team)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: Sandworm / APT44
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: Sandworm / APT44
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionExecutive Summary
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionATT CK as a Working Tool Theory and Hands On Practical Usage
1200km Medium · authored report mentionAttack Playbook Operation DragonRx
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCTI Research Handala Hack Group aka Handala Hack Team
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCTI Research Sandworm APT44
1200km Medium · authored report mention