1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH
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T1046 Network Service Discovery — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system. Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.[CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021]

Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.

Within macOS environments, adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers and advertises a host’s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as <code>dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .</code>) to find other systems broadcasting the ssh service.[apple doco bonjour description][macOS APT Activity Bradley]

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Network Connection Creation · source-mapped

DC0082 collection page — Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, initiated.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0082",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "initiated": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Network Traffic Content · source-mapped

DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
  • Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
  • Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
  • Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
  • Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0085",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
    "protocol": "http",
    "method": "GET",
    "path": "/lab-check",
    "payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

Network Traffic Flow · source-mapped

DC0078 collection page — Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
  • Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
  • AWS VPC Flow Logs: IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.
  • Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
  • Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
  • Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: source_ip, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, bytes_sent, bytes_received.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0078",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "bytes_sent": 128,
    "bytes_received": 512
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

Process Creation · source-mapped

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0376 Behavioral Detection Strategy for Network Service Discovery Across Platforms

MITRE detection strategy

AN1057 Analytic 1057

Detects processes performing network enumeration (e.g., port scans, service probing) by correlating process creation, socket connections, and sequential destination IP probing within a time window.

Platforms: Windows.

AN1058 Analytic 1058

Detects use of network scanning utilities or scripts performing rapid connections to multiple services or hosts using auditd and netflow/pcap telemetry.

Platforms: Linux.

AN1059 Analytic 1059

Detects Bonjour-based mDNS enumeration or use of system tools (e.g., dns-sd, nmap) to find active services via multicast probing or targeted scans.

Platforms: macOS.

AN1060 Analytic 1060

Detects lateral discovery or container breakout attempts using netcat, curl, or custom binaries probing other services within the same namespace or VPC subnet.

Platforms: Containers.

Source rule directory and observation requirements

19 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Network and protocol telemetry: Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

36 source-documented software associations

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: 13 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell

Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask.
The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in milliseconds to speed up the scan. Please note the atomic might not print any output until the scans are completed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 05df2a79-dba6-4088-a804-9ca0802ca8e4 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • ip_address: IP-Address within the target subnet. Default is empty and script tries to determine local IP address of attacking machine. A comma separated list of targe IPs is also accepted (useful to simulate a wider scan while only scanning key host e.g., honeypots) (type string; source default )
  • port_list: Comma separated list of ports to scan (type string; source default 445, 3389)
  • timeout_ms: Connection timeout in milliseconds (type string; source default 200)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Network Service Discovery for Containers

Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and vulnerability scans in order to obtain this information.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 06eaafdb-8982-426e-8a31-d572da633caa · containers · sh.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

2 prerequisite definitions:

  • Verify docker is installed.
  • Verify docker service is running.
Port Scan using nmap (Port range)

Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap

Pinned Atomic procedure · 0d5a2b03-3a26-45e4-96ae-89485b4d1f97 · linux, macos · sh.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • host: Host(s) to scan. (type string; source default 127.0.0.1)
  • port_range: Port range(s) to scan. (type string; source default 0-65535)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Check if nmap command exists on the machine
WinPwn - bluekeep

Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).

Pinned Atomic procedure · 1cca5640-32a9-46e6-b8e0-fabbe2384a73 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Windows - Port Scan using RustScan (Port list)

Scan ports on a target host using RustScan. Downloads the portable RustScan release binary and scans 127.0.0.1 by default. Uses --greppable so that nmap is not a dependency.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 32c268dd-96a7-4530-817c-848534a39d09 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • rustscan_url: RustScan Windows release zip download URL (type url; source default https://github.com/bee-san/RustScan/releases/download/2.4.1/x86_64-windows-rustscan.exe.zip)
  • host_to_scan: The host to scan with RustScan (type string; source default 127.0.0.1)
  • port_list: Comma-separated list of ports to scan (RustScan -p) (type string; source default 22,80,443,3389)
  • rustscan_path: Where the RustScan binary will be downloaded to or already is located (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rustscan.exe)
  • MVC_url: Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable download URL (type url; source default https://aka.ms/vc14/vc_redist.x64.exe)
  • MVC_path: Where the Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable installer will be downloaded to or already is located (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\vc_redist.x64.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

2 prerequisite definitions:

  • RustScan must be available
  • Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable must be installed (RustScan needs VCRUNTIME140.dll)
Port Scan Nmap

Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap.
Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 515942b0-a09f-4163-a7bb-22fefb6f185f · linux, macos · sh.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • host: Host to scan. (type string; source default 192.168.1.1)
  • port: Ports to scan. (type string; source default 80)
  • network_range: Network Range to Scan. (type string; source default 192.168.1.0/24)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

3 prerequisite definitions:

  • Check if nmap command exists on the machine
  • Check if nc command exists on the machine
  • Check if telnet command exists on the machine
WinPwn - spoolvulnscan

Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn

Pinned Atomic procedure · 54574908-f1de-4356-9021-8053dd57439a · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Port Scan

Scan ports to check for listening ports.

Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 68e907da-2539-48f6-9fc9-257a78c05540 · linux, macos · bash.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • host: Host to scan. (type string; source default 192.168.1.1)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Port Scan using python

Scan ports to check for listening ports with python

Pinned Atomic procedure · 6ca45b04-9f15-4424-b9d3-84a217285a5c · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • host_ip: Host to scan. (type string; source default 127.0.0.1)
  • filename: Location of the project file (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\T1046\src\T1046.py)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Check if python exists on the machine
WinPwn - MS17-10

Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn

Pinned Atomic procedure · 97585b04-5be2-40e9-8c31-82157b8af2d6 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell

Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell

Pinned Atomic procedure · 9e55750e-4cbf-4013-9627-e9a045b541bf · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

WinPwn - fruit

Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn

Pinned Atomic procedure · bb037826-cbe8-4a41-93ea-b94059d6bb98 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Port Scan NMap for Windows

Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1

Pinned Atomic procedure · d696a3cb-d7a8-4976-8eb5-5af4abf2e3df · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • nmap_url: NMap installer download URL (type url; source default https://nmap.org/dist/nmap-7.80-setup.exe)
  • host_to_scan: The host to scan with NMap (type string; source default 127.0.0.1)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • NMap must be installed

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1046 Network Service Discovery; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Network Service Discovery, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

enterprisecloudcloud-hosted-endpointcontainersnetwork-infrastructureonpremContainersIaaSLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindowsdiscoveryisolated_authorized_labprocedure_review_requiredtelemetry_configuration_requireddisposable_tenant_and_cost_controlssome_candidates_require_elevation
Atomic candidate documentedtechniquesource_mapped

Source procedure platform / method / executor tags:

windowsautomatedpowershellcontainersshlinuxmacosbash

Detection and collection

T1046 detection workspace

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Connected anomaly research

Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.

Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.