Linux Network Service Scanning - Auditd · test · low · {"product":"linux","service":"auditd","definition":"Configure these rules https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/e181243a7c708e9d579557d6f80e0ed3d3483b89/audit.rules#L182-L183"}
Python Initiated Connection · test · medium · {"category":"network_connection","product":"windows","definition":"Requirements: Field enrichment is required for the filters to work. As field such as CommandLine and ParentImage are not available by default on this event type"}
HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock · test · high · {"category":"ps_script","product":"windows","definition":"Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled"}
Detects processes performing network enumeration (e.g., port scans, service probing) by correlating process creation, socket connections, and sequential destination IP probing within a time window.
Detects use of network scanning utilities or scripts performing rapid connections to multiple services or hosts using auditd and netflow/pcap telemetry.
Detects lateral discovery or container breakout attempts using netcat, curl, or custom binaries probing other services within the same namespace or VPC subnet.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Exact source tags are not semantic relevance verdicts. Review actual rule conditions and observation points; imported rules are not backend-compiled or live-validated.
Connected anomaly research
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.