1200KM / simulation
T1005 Data from Local System — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this using a Command and Scripting Interpreter, such as cmd as well as a Network Device CLI, which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Adversaries may also use Automated…
Technique description
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this using a Command and Scripting Interpreter, such as cmd as well as a Network Device CLI, which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Adversaries may also use Automated…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- Find and dump sqlite databases (Linux)
Procedure 00cbb875-7ae4-4cf1-b638-e543fd825300; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Copy Apple Notes database files using AppleScript
Procedure cfb6d400-a269-4c06-a347-6d88d584d5f7; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Search files of interest and save them to a single zip file (Windows)
Procedure d3d9af44-b8ad-4375-8b0a-4bff4b7e419c; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
- Axiom · G0001
- Ke3chang · G0004
- APT1 · G0006
- APT28 · G0007
- Turla · G0010
- APT29 · G0016
- APT3 · G0022
- Threat Group-3390 · G0027
- Lazarus Group · G0032
- Sandworm Team · G0034
- Dragonfly · G0035
- FIN6 · G0037
- Stealth Falcon · G0038
- Patchwork · G0040
- menuPass · G0045
- FIN7 · G0046
- Gamaredon Group · G0047
- OilRig · G0049
- Magic Hound · G0059
- BRONZE BUTLER · G0060
- APT37 · G0067
- Dark Caracal · G0070
- APT38 · G0082
- APT39 · G0087
- GALLIUM · G0093
- Kimsuky · G0094
- APT41 · G0096
- Inception · G0100
- Wizard Spider · G0102
- Fox Kitten · G0117
- Windigo · G0124
- HAFNIUM · G0125
- Andariel · G0138
- Aquatic Panda · G0143
- Ember Bear · G1003
- LAPSUS$ · G1004
- CURIUM · G1012
- LuminousMoth · G1014
- FIN13 · G1016
- Volt Typhoon · G1017
- ToddyCat · G1022
- Agrius · G1030
- RedCurl · G1039
- MirrorFace · G1054
- VOID MANTICORE · G1055
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.