1200KM / sigma-rule
ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection By Uncommon Tool — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 1ea13e8c-03ea-409b-877d-ce5c3d2c1cb3. ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection By Uncommon Tool — Sigma Rule. Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database). Used to access information such as the AD FS configuration settings which contains sensitive information used to sign SAML tokens.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2021-10-08 / 2023-11-30.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "pipe_created",
"definition": "Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: f2f8221fc26b2daa9fd19ab04671aeda3e8aa02bb3536b3a9c752308aff58e9b
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection By Uncommon Tool
id: 1ea13e8c-03ea-409b-877d-ce5c3d2c1cb3
status: test
description: |
Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database).
Used to access information such as the AD FS configuration settings which contains sensitive information used to sign SAML tokens.
references:
- https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSDBNamedPipeConnection.yaml
- https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
- https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
date: 2021-10-08
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
selection:
PipeName: '\MICROSOFT##WID\tsql\query'
filter_main_generic:
Image|endswith:
- ':\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
- ':\Windows\system32\svchost.exe'
- ':\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\mmc.exe'
- ':\Windows\SysWOW64\wsmprovhost.exe'
- ':\Windows\WID\Binn\sqlwriter.exe'
- '\AzureADConnect.exe'
- '\Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe'
- '\Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe'
- '\Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe'
- '\sqlservr.exe'
- '\tssdis.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.