1200KM / simulation
T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may disable or modify the Windows Event Log to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows Event Log records user and system activity such as login attempts and process creation. This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections. The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications. By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on.…
Technique description
Adversaries may disable or modify the Windows Event Log to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows Event Log records user and system activity such as login attempts and process creation. This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections. The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications. By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on.…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- Makes Eventlog blind with Phant0m
Procedure 3ddf3d03-f5d6-462a-ad76-2c5ff7b6d741; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Kill Event Log Service Threads
Procedure 41ac52ba-5d5e-40c0-b267-573ed90489bd; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Impair Windows Audit Log Policy
Procedure 5102a3a7-e2d7-4129-9e45-f483f2e0eea8; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging
Procedure 69435dcf-c66f-4ec0-a8b1-82beb76b34db; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Modify Event Log Channel Access Permissions via Registry 2 - PowerShell
Procedure 85e6eff8-3ed4-4e03-ae50-aa6a404898a5; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Modify Event Log Channel Access Permissions via Registry - PowerShell
Procedure 8e81d090-0cd6-4d46-863c-eec11311298f; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Clear Windows Audit Policy Config
Procedure 913c0e4e-4b37-4b78-ad0b-90e7b25010f6; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Modify Event Log Access Permissions via Registry - PowerShell
Procedure a0cb81f8-44d0-4ac4-a8f3-c5c7f43a12c1; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Disable Windows IIS HTTP Logging via PowerShell
Procedure a957fb0f-1e85-49b2-a211-413366784b1e; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Disable Event Logging with wevtutil
Procedure b26a3340-dad7-4360-9176-706269c74103; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.