1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH
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T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location — Detection Rules

Detection workspace for T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location: 14 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.

Source-backed rule directory

Atlas deterministic concepts

No exact concept selected.

Anomaly models

No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.

ATT&CK analytic guidance

DET0347 Detection Strategy for Masquerading via Legitimate Resource Name or Location

AN0983 Analytic 0983

Detects processes or binaries executed from trusted directories (e.g., System32) or using trusted names (e.g., svchost.exe) where the metadata, hash, or parent process does not align with legitimate activity patterns.

AN0984 Analytic 0984

Detects renamed binaries or scripts placed into trusted paths like /usr/bin or /lib with mismatched metadata or unexpected creation/modification times.

AN0985 Analytic 0985

Detects binaries or launch daemons in /System/Library or /Applications with mismatched bundle names, unexpected metadata, or improper installation origin.

AN0986 Analytic 0986

Detects malicious containers or pods using names, labels, or namespaces that mimic legitimate workloads; also checks for image layer mismatches and unauthorized resource deployments.

AN0987 Analytic 0987

Detects VIBs, scripts, or binaries placed into directories like /bin or /etc/vmware with names mimicking standard ESXi components. Also monitors unauthorized creation of services.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Simulation, tools and telemetry

T1036.005 simulation workspace

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing anomaly research

Original publication snapshot · Anomaly Detection Atlas

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.