{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0802","id":"T0802","name":"Automated Collection","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0802","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"adb66dc7db7a00acdc58967b7c6d1bfb878fb1feace3bcaf57c8246d53f243a9","description":"Adversaries may automate collection of industrial environment information using tools or scripts. This automated collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in the control systems environment. For example, the OPC protocol may be used to enumerate and gather information. Access to a system or interface with these native protocols may allow collection and enumeration of other attached, communicating servers and devices.","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0802","external_id":"T0802"}],"platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Execution of a command and its interpreter or parent context.","collection_focus":"Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["interpreter","command_line","actor_uid","session_id"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation or overwrite of a file at an observed path.","collection_focus":"Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["process_id","path","action","size_bytes"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0029","name":"Script Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0029/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Script and command execution","description":"Script content or script execution observations from an interpreter-aware sensor.","collection_focus":"Collect PowerShell 4104 with script-block ID and fragment sequence; instrument other engines separately rather than assigning them the same event ID.","providers":[{"name":"PowerShell Script Block Logging","scope":"Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.","source_id":"powershell"},{"name":"Sysmon process events","scope":"Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.","Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.","On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Read recent Windows PowerShell script-block events","language":"powershell","source_id":"powershell","content":"Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{\n  LogName = 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'\n  Id = 4104\n} -MaxEvents 5","note":"Read-only check after Script Block Logging is configured. For PowerShell 7 use its registered PowerShellCore/Operational channel. Missing events are not proof of no execution; check policy, channel and permissions."},"required_fields":["engine","script_block_id","fragment","fragments_total","script_text"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0029","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"engine":"PowerShell","script_block_id":"lab-script-1","fragment":1,"fragments_total":1,"script_text":"Write-Output \"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK\""}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.","sources":[{"id":"powershell","title":"Microsoft PowerShell logging on Windows","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_logging_windows?view=powershell-7.5"},{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0802","id":"T0802","name":"Automated Collection","domain":"ics","platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0802","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0802/","page":"detections/ics/T0802/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":3,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0734","name":"Detection of Automated Collection","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0734","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--442bf059-f7cf-460b-8200-f35e1e0a0c78","relationship_id":"relationship--98f91f4f-050b-43b7-a033-589ec507913f","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1867","name":"Analytic 1867","guidance":"Real-time network monitoring identifies a source issuing systematic, sequential Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol reads sweeping the full register/address range across multiple field devices within a short time window, from a source not in the approved control server list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0734#AN1867","platforms":["Embedded"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedHistorianClients","description":"Allowlist of applications/accounts authorized to perform bulk historian queries."},{"field":"ApprovedSCADAServers","description":"IP allowlist of legitimate SCADA/historian servers."},{"field":"AutoCollectionTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which sequential reads across multiple devices are considered part of a single automated collection event."},{"field":"BulkQueryThreshold","description":"Record count threshold above which a historian query is considered a bulk export rather than a routine query."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0064","component":"Command Execution","name":"historian:applog","channel":"bulk export query returning above bulk query threshold records from account not in approved historian clients","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN1867","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0734#AN1867","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0064/"},{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Content","channel":"source not in approved Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) servers issuing reads covering sequential address ranges across multiple device Internet Protocol (IP) addresses within auto collection time window","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN1867","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0734#AN1867","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN2128","name":"Analytic 2128","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a scripting interpreter process iterating through Industrial Control System (ICS) data sources and writing output to a local file or piping to a network socket, by a User Identifier (UID) not associated with documented automation scripts. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0734#AN2128","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedHistorianClients","description":"Allowlist of applications/accounts authorized to perform bulk historian queries."},{"field":"ApprovedSCADAServers","description":"IP allowlist of legitimate SCADA/historian servers."},{"field":"AutoCollectionTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which sequential reads across multiple devices are considered part of a single automated collection event."},{"field":"BulkQueryThreshold","description":"Record count threshold above which a historian query is considered a bulk export rather than a routine query."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0029","component":"Script Execution","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"Linux Audit SYSCALL/EXECVE/SOCKADDR records (configured audit rule): execve of scripting interpreter making sequential Industrial Control Systems (ICS) protocol reads with output to file, by User Identifier (UID) not in authorized scripting UIDs","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2128","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0734#AN2128","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0029/"}]},{"id":"AN2270","name":"Analytic 2270","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a host process making sequential Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol reads with output piped to a local staging file, from a process not associated with a recognized Human-Machine Interface (HMI) or historian tool. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0734#AN2270","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"ApprovedHistorianClients","description":"Allowlist of applications/accounts authorized to perform bulk historian queries."},{"field":"ApprovedSCADAServers","description":"IP allowlist of legitimate SCADA/historian servers."},{"field":"AutoCollectionTimeWindow","description":"Time window within which sequential reads across multiple devices are considered part of a single automated collection event."},{"field":"BulkQueryThreshold","description":"Record count threshold above which a historian query is considered a bulk export rather than a routine query."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0039","component":"File Creation","name":"WinEventLog:Sysmon","channel":"EventCode=11 where an unrecognized process creates a staging/output file after bulk ICS data access activity","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2270","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0734#AN2270","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0039/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0064","name":"Command Execution","tag":"Command Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0064/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0039","name":"File Creation","tag":"File Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0039/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0029","name":"Script Execution","tag":"Script Execution","page":"telemetry/DC0029/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0093","name":"Backdoor.Oldrea","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093","kind":"malware","description":"Using OPC, a component of [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) gathers any details about connected devices and sends them back to the C2 for the attackers to analyze. (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014)","relationship_id":"relationship--8f76d408-be8a-478e-8a5a-aab1d1f96572","references":[{"source_name":"Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014","description":"Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen 2014, June 23 Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2019/04/01 ","url":"https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html"}]},{"id":"S0604","name":"Industroyer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604","kind":"malware","description":"[Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) automatically collects protocol object data to learn about control devices in the environment. (Citation: Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--c4122b58-f1b2-4656-a715-55016700bf75","references":[{"source_name":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017","description":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET 2017, June 12 Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems Retrieved. 2017/09/15 ","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1072","name":"Industroyer2","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1072","kind":"malware","description":"[Industroyer2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1072) leverages a hardcoded list of remote-station IP addresses to iteratively initiate communications and collect information across multiple priority IEC-104 priority levels.(Citation: Industroyer2 Forescout July 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--6ff846b1-9444-45f1-837a-4eeeb16bdfe7","references":[{"source_name":"Industroyer2 Forescout July 2022","description":"Forescout. (2022, July 14). Industroyer2 and  INCONTROLLER In-depth Technical Analysis of the Most Recent ICS-specific Malware. Retrieved March 30, 2023.","url":"https://www.forescout.com/resources/industroyer2-and-incontroller-report/"}]}],"actors":[],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0807","name":"Network Allowlists","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Utilize network allowlists to restrict unnecessary connections to network devices (e.g., comm servers, serial to ethernet converters) and services, especially in cases when devices have limits on the number of simultaneous sessions they support.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--6f0384e6-73c8-4fc7-bc0c-0a8c2bfa473d","references":[]},{"id":"M0930","name":"Network Segmentation","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Prevent unauthorized systems from accessing control servers or field devices containing industrial information, especially services used for common automation protocols (e.g., DNP3, OPC).\n","relationship_id":"relationship--a08d85dd-a8b3-4848-94aa-941c43b6d8f2","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0802":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0802/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0802","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0064","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"interpreter":"/bin/sh","command_line":"printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK","actor_uid":1000,"session_id":"lab-session-1"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0039","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_id":4200,"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","action":"create","size_bytes":64}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0029","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"engine":"PowerShell","script_block_id":"lab-script-1","fragment":1,"fragments_total":1,"script_text":"Write-Output \"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK\""}}]}}