1200KM / simulation
Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also…
Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., Transfer Data to Cloud Account).
The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:
* Policies, procedures, and standards
* Physical / logical network diagrams
* System architecture diagrams
* Technical system documentation
* Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials)
* Work / project schedules
* Source code snippets
* Links to network shares and other internal resources
* Contact or other sensitive information about business partners and customers, including personally identifiable information (PII)
Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include the following:
* Storage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and more specialized platforms such as customer relationship management (CRM) databases
* Collaboration platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories
* Messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams
In some cases, information repositories have been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users. This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-hosted services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), Redis, or ElasticSearch.[Mitiga][TrendMicro Exposed Redis 2020][Cybernews Reuters Leak 2022]
Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix
Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
DC0038 collection page — Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.
Required normalized fields: service, action, actor, record_count, result.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0038",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"service": "lab-portal",
"action": "export_requested",
"actor": "lab-reader",
"record_count": 3,
"result": "authorized"
}
}Visibility limits: Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.
DC0069 collection page — Collect the service-specific update API and resulting configuration state; record account/project, actor and changed settings.
Required normalized fields: service, resource_id, attribute, before, after.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0069",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"service": "lab-audit-service",
"resource_id": "lab-service-1",
"attribute": "retention_days",
"before": 7,
"after": 30
}
}Visibility limits: AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.
DC0025 collection page — Explicitly select relevant object-read data events; keep principal, key, request ID and result without object contents.
Required normalized fields: action, bucket, key, actor, result.
[
{
"Name": "LabObjectReads",
"FieldSelectors": [
{
"Field": "eventCategory",
"Equals": [
"Data"
]
},
{
"Field": "resources.type",
"Equals": [
"AWS::S3::Object"
]
},
{
"Field": "resources.ARN",
"StartsWith": [
"arn:aws:s3:::lab-bucket/demo/"
]
},
{
"Field": "readOnly",
"Equals": [
"true"
]
}
]
}
]Replace the placeholder with an owned lab bucket/prefix. Review costs and merge with required selectors; applying selectors can replace an existing selection. This does not enable management-event retention or object-write coverage.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0025",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"action": "get_object",
"bucket": "lab-bucket",
"key": "demo.txt",
"actor": "lab-reader",
"result": "success"
}
}Visibility limits: Storage metadata, listing, object access and bucket administration are different operations. Do not equate a successful request with proven exfiltration or complete content visibility.
DC0064 collection page — Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.
Required normalized fields: interpreter, command_line, actor_uid, session_id.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0064",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"interpreter": "/bin/sh",
"command_line": "printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK",
"actor_uid": 1000,
"session_id": "lab-session-1"
}
}Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.
DC0055 collection page — Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.
Required normalized fields: path, access, actor, result.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0055",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
"access": "read",
"actor": "LAB\\analyst",
"result": "success"
}
}Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.
DC0082 collection page — Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, initiated.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0082",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
"destination_port": 443,
"protocol": "tcp",
"initiated": true
}
}Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
DC0102 collection page — Enable Audit File Share / Detailed File Share on the lab file server; correlate share checks with file-system access and requesting host/account.
Required normalized fields: share, relative_path, access, source_ip.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0102",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"share": "\\\\lab-server\\demo",
"relative_path": "demo.txt",
"access": "read",
"source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
}
}Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.
DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.
<EventFiltering>
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
</ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0032",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
"parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"command_line": "whoami",
"user": "LAB\\analyst"
}
}Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering
Programmatic or excessive access to file shares, SharePoint, or database repositories by users not typically interacting with them. This includes abnormal access by privileged accounts, enumeration of large numbers of files, or downloads of sensitive content in bursts.
Platforms: Windows.
Command-line tools (e.g., curl, rsync, wget, or custom Python scripts) used to scrape documentation systems or internal REST APIs. Unusual access patterns to knowledge base folders or shared team drives.
Platforms: Linux.
Abuse of SaaS platforms such as Confluence, GitHub, SharePoint Online, or Slack to access excessive internal documentation or export source code/data. Includes use of tokens or browser automation from unapproved IPs.
Platforms: SaaS.
Access of mounted cloud shares or document repositories via browser, terminal, or Finder by users not typically interacting with those resources. Includes script-based enumeration or mass download.
Platforms: macOS.
7 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.
COUNT(repository_reads_or_exports BY actor, 10m) >= threshold OR MATCH(bulk_export_operation) -> ALERTNo exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1213 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.
Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.
Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots
No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.
These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.
Raccoon Stealer gathers information from repositories associated with cryptocurrency wallets and the Telegram messaging service.[Sekoia Raccoon2 2022]
Exact relationship: relationship--77cf946d-eb39-4f49-abd0-a64733ea9538Troll Stealer gathers information from the Government Public Key Infrastructure (GPKI) folder, associated with South Korean government public key infrastructure, on infected systems.[S2W Troll Stealer 2024][Symantec Troll Stealer 2024]
Exact relationship: relationship--7d1f1a6a-f2ab-4ee9-9c06-6afeac5d033bAtomic evidence: no compatible candidate in this snapshot. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.
Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.
No compatible Atomic procedure is present in this pinned evidence set. Technical feasibility has not been ruled out. A custom procedure must define the behavior, target, collection point, success observable and rollback before execution.
Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook
This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Data from Information Repositories, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.
Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.
All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook
Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored in repositories.
Enforce the principle of least-privilege. Consider implementing access control mechanisms that include both authentication and authorization.
Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator.
Encrypt data stored at rest in databases.
Consider periodic review of accounts and privileges for critical and sensitive repositories. Ensure that repositories such as cloud-hosted databases are not unintentionally exposed to the public, and that security groups assigned to them permit only necessary and authorized hosts.[AWS DB VPC]
Consider implementing data retention policies to automate periodically archiving and/or deleting data that is no longer needed.
Create plans for leveraging a secure out-of-band communications channel, rather than existing in-network chat applications, in case of a security incident.[TrustedSec OOB Communications]
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.