- AN0095 · Analytic 0095 — Identifies adversary behavior that launches commands or invokes APIs to enumerate active processes (e.g., tasklist.exe, Get-Process, or CreateToolhelp32Snapshot). Detects execution combined with parent process lineage, network session context, or remote origin.
- AN0096 · Analytic 0096 — Detects execution of common process enumeration utilities (e.g., ps, top, htop) or access to /proc with suspicious ancestry. Correlates command usage with interactive shell context and user role.
- AN0097 · Analytic 0097 — Monitors execution of ps, top, or launchctl with unusual parent processes or from terminal scripts. Also detects AppleScript-based process listing or `system_profiler SPApplicationsDataType` misuse.
- AN0098 · Analytic 0098 — Detects process enumeration using `esxcli system process list` or `ps` on ESXi shell or via unauthorized SSH sessions. Correlates with interactive sessions and abnormal user roles.
- AN0099 · Analytic 0099 — Monitors CLI-based execution of `show process` or equivalent on routers/switches. Correlates unusual device access, unauthorized roles, or config mode changes.
AdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
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Process Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility via [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or <code>Get-Process</code> via [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls such as <code>CreateToolhelp32Snapshot</code>. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via `/proc`. ESXi also supports use of the `ps` command, as well as `esxcli system process list`.(Citation: Sygnia ESXi Ransomware 2025)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021) On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show processes` can be used to display current running processes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: show_processes_cisco_cmd)
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.
Observed actors
G0004APT1
G0006APT28
G0007Deep Panda
G0009Turla
G0010Darkhotel
G0012Molerats
G0021APT3
G0022Lazarus Group
G0032Poseidon Group
G0033Stealth Falcon
G0038Winnti Group
G0044FIN7
G0046Gamaredon Group
G0047OilRig
G0049Magic Hound
G0059APT37
G0067MuddyWater
G0069Tropic Trooper
G0081APT38
G0082Kimsuky
G0094Inception
G0100Rocke
G0106Windshift
G0112Chimera
G0114Sidewinder
G0121HAFNIUM
G0125Higaisa
G0126Mustang Panda
G0129Andariel
G0138TeamTNT
G0139HEXANE
G1001Earth Lusca
G1006Volt Typhoon
G1017ToddyCat
G1022APT5
G1023Play
G1040UNC3886
G1048Medusa Group
G1051Storm-0501
G1053MirrorFace
G1054NIMBUS MANTICORE
G1059
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
OSINT & Reconnaissance · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Cloud, containers, and Kubernetes
Red Team & Offensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Data classification, storage, cryptography, keys, backup, and deletion
Cloud Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
No ATT&CK mitigation relationship is published for this technique. Apply risk-based controls and verify scope.
MITRE detection strategies and analytics
Continue the investigation
Attack tools, simulations and detection rules
Follow explicit source relationships into the reference modules. Linked procedures and detectors are not claims of live validation or actor attribution.
- T1057 Process Discovery simulation — Exact active technique ID
- T1057 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage