1200KM / telemetry
API Calls — Detection Telemetry
Instrumented mobile API calls and results relevant to an application behavior.
Collection and providers
Instrument selected APIs in the owned test app or approved research build; log caller, API, sanitized argument class and return status.
- Android logcat: Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.
- Android dumpsys: Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.
- Instrumented test application: Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.
Configuration
- Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.
- Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.
- Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0112",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"package": "test.example.lab",
"api": "android.hardware.camera2.CameraManager.openCamera",
"result": "permission_denied",
"thread": "main"
}
}Visibility and validation
Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
- T1404 · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1406 · Obfuscated Files or Information · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1631 · Process Injection · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1631.001 · Ptrace System Calls · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1633 · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1633.001 · System Checks · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1634 · Credentials from Password Store · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1634.001 · Keychain · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1635 · Steal Application Access Token · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1635.001 · URI Hijacking · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1641 · Data Manipulation · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1641.001 · Transmitted Data Manipulation · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1645 · Compromise Client Software Binary · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1655 · Masquerading · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1655.001 · Match Legitimate Name or Location · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1661 · Application Versioning · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1662 · Data Destruction · Detection rules & anomalies
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.