1200KM / detection
T1641 Data Manipulation — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1641 Data Manipulation: 0 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0660 Detection of Data Manipulation
AN1750 Analytic 1750
For Android, detect Data Manipulation from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: ContentResolver.update() called by writer_app NOT IN $LegitimateIPCPartners$ for target_app's content provider URI]; Application State via Android Enterprise / EMM [Managed package inventory/status and package metadata]; File Modification via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: ContentResolver.update() or write() to path owned by target_app IN $HighValueAppList$ by writer_app != target_app — cross-app data modification]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Existing anomaly research
Complete technique engineering workbook
Collection configuration and event examples · Anomaly models and design worksheet · Tools and documented software · Simulation procedures · Offline synthetic collection check
Exact source tags are not semantic relevance verdicts. Review actual rule conditions and observation points; imported rules are not backend-compiled or live-validated.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.