1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH
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T1640 Account Access Removal — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: credentials changed) to remove access to accounts.

Complete technique description

Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: credentials changed) to remove access to accounts.

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

API Calls · source-mapped

DC0112 collection page — Instrument selected APIs in the owned test app or approved research build; log caller, API, sanitized argument class and return status.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Android logcat: Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.
  • Android dumpsys: Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.
  • Instrumented test application: Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.
  • Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.
  • Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.
  • Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session.

Required normalized fields: package, api, result, thread.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0112",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "package": "test.example.lab",
    "api": "android.hardware.camera2.CameraManager.openCamera",
    "result": "permission_denied",
    "thread": "main"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.

Application Permission · source-mapped

DC0114 collection page — Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Android logcat: Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.
  • Android dumpsys: Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.
  • Instrumented test application: Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.
  • Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.
  • Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.
  • Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session.

Required normalized fields: package, permission, declared, granted.

adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab

Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0114",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "package": "test.example.lab",
    "permission": "android.permission.CAMERA",
    "declared": true,
    "granted": false
  }
}

Visibility limits: Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.

Host Status · source-mapped

DC0018 collection page — Collect agent heartbeat and OS health independently; record missed polls, last-seen time and monitor health.

Providers and collection configuration

  • osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
  • Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
  • Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
  • Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
  • Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.

Required normalized fields: asset_id, status, heartbeat_age_seconds, collector_healthy.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0018",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "asset_id": "lab-host-1",
    "status": "degraded",
    "heartbeat_age_seconds": 90,
    "collector_healthy": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0605 Detection of Account Access Removal

MITRE detection strategy

AN1655 Analytic 1655

For Android, detect Account Access Removal by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: DevicePolicyManager.resetPassword() or lockNow() or wipeData() called by caller NOT IN $MDMAgentPackageList$]; Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; Host Status via Android Enterprise DPC [DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.

Platforms: Android.

  • API Calls — mobile:DynamicAnalysis; channel Dynamic API/runtime trace: DevicePolicyManager.resetPassword() or lockNow() or wipeData() called by caller NOT IN $MDMAgentPackageList$.
  • Application Permission — android:DevicePolicyManager; channel DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review.
  • Host Status — android:DevicePolicyManager; channel DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported.
Source rule directory and observation requirements

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1640 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Mobile lab instrumentation: Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability.
  • Host state and inventory: Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

1 source-documented software associations

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: no compatible candidate in this snapshot. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.

No compatible Atomic procedure is present in this pinned evidence set. Technical feasibility has not been ruled out. A custom procedure must define the behavior, target, collection point, success observable and rollback before execution.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1640 Account Access Removal; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Account Access Removal, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations
  • M1011 User Guidance

    Users should be taught that Device Administrator permissions are very dangerous, and very few applications need it.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

mobilemobileAndroidimpactisolated_authorized_labprocedure_review_requiredtelemetry_configuration_requireddevice_or_emulator_and_sensor_access_requiredpotential_disruption_requires_individual_review
No Atomic candidate in snapshottechniquesource_mapped

Detection and collection

T1640 detection workspace

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.