T1417 Input Capture — Attack Simulation

DC0112 collection page — Instrument selected APIs in the owned test app or approved research build; log caller, API, sanitized argument class and return status.

Providers and collection configuration

• Android logcat: Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.
• Android dumpsys: Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.
• Instrumented test application: Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.

• Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.
• Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.
• Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session.

Required normalized fields: package, api, result, thread.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0112",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "package": "test.example.lab",
    "api": "android.hardware.camera2.CameraManager.openCamera",
    "result": "permission_denied",
    "thread": "main"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.

DC0123 collection page — Instrument the owned app lifecycle and corroborate permitted service snapshots; distinguish app events from inferred gateway activity.

Providers and collection configuration

• Android logcat: Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.
• Android dumpsys: Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.
• Instrumented test application: Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.

• Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.
• Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.
• Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session.

Required normalized fields: package, state_before, state_after, source.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0123",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "package": "test.example.lab",
    "state_before": "background",
    "state_after": "foreground",
    "source": "own_app_callback"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.

DC0078 collection page — Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.

Providers and collection configuration

• Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
• Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
• AWS VPC Flow Logs: IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.

• Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
• Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
• Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: source_ip, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, bytes_sent, bytes_received.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0078",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "bytes_sent": 128,
    "bytes_received": 512
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

DC0116 collection page — Correlate own-app request/callback instrumentation with the consented test-device prompt. A request callback alone does not prove a prompt appeared (for example, a previously denied permission).

Providers and collection configuration

• Android logcat: Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.
• Android dumpsys: Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.
• Instrumented test application: Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.

• Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.
• Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.
• Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session.

Required normalized fields: package, permission, action, prompt_observed, result.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0116",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "package": "test.example.lab",
    "permission": "android.permission.CAMERA",
    "action": "permission_prompt",
    "prompt_observed": true,
    "result": "denied"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.

MITRE detection strategy

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

• S1126 Phenakite — malware.

  Phenakite has used phishing sites for iCloud and Facebook if either of those were used for authentication during the chat sign up process.[fb_arid_viper]

  Exact relationship: relationship--922fa6eb-7274-477c-821e-ae6684c08934
• S1225 CherryBlos — malware.

  CherryBlos has captured victims' credentials through predefined fake activities.[TrendMicro_CherryBlos_July2023]

  Exact relationship: relationship--1659ff92-3a84-4cc3-84dc-42dcc8a91dc4
• S1231 GodFather — malware.

  GodFather has the captured information about the device's screen to include detailed tap events.[ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025]

  Exact relationship: relationship--f8312ce3-3533-46e7-bf93-90541f9b5c69

• M1006 Use Recent OS Version

  The `HIDE_OVERLAY_WINDOWS` permission was introduced in Android 12 allowing apps to hide overlay windows of type `TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY` drawn by other apps with the `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission, preventing other applications from creating overlay windows on top of the current application.[Android 12 Features]

• M1011 User Guidance

  Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as keyboard registration or accessibility service access.

• M1012 Enterprise Policy

  When using Samsung Knox, third-party keyboards must be explicitly added to an allow list in order to be available to the end-user.[Samsung Keyboards] An EMM/MDM can use the Android `DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices` method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features.