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T0878 Alarm Suppression — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. A Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm suppression: prevent outgoing alarms…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole.

A Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. [Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019] The method of suppression may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question:

* An alarm raised by a protocol message
* An alarm signaled with I/O
* An alarm bit set in a flag (and read)

In ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. [Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019] Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code.

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Application Log Content · source-mapped

DC0038 collection page — Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.
  • Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.
  • Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart.

Required normalized fields: service, action, actor, record_count, result.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0038",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "service": "lab-portal",
    "action": "export_requested",
    "actor": "lab-reader",
    "record_count": 3,
    "result": "authorized"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.

Device Alarm · source-mapped

DC0108 collection page — Subscribe to supported device alarm/audit channels; retain code, severity, source asset and acknowledgement/clear times.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.
  • Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.
  • Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs.

Required normalized fields: asset_id, alarm_code, severity, active.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0108",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "asset_id": "lab-controller-1",
    "alarm_code": "LAB_COMM_LOSS",
    "severity": "warning",
    "active": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.

File Creation · source-mapped

DC0039 collection page — Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_id, path, action, size_bytes.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0039",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_id": 4200,
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "action": "create",
    "size_bytes": 64
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

File Modification · source-mapped

DC0061 collection page — Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: path, attribute, before, after.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0061",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "attribute": "content_hash",
    "before": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
    "after": "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Network Traffic Content · source-mapped

DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
  • Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
  • Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
  • Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
  • Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0085",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
    "protocol": "http",
    "method": "GET",
    "path": "/lab-check",
    "payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

Network Traffic Flow · source-mapped

DC0078 collection page — Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
  • Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
  • AWS VPC Flow Logs: IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.
  • Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
  • Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
  • Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: source_ip, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, bytes_sent, bytes_received.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0078",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "bytes_sent": 128,
    "bytes_received": 512
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

Process History/Live Data · source-mapped

DC0107 collection page — Export historian/process tags with engineering units, quality and source timestamps; define expected sample rate and compare an independent signal.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.
  • Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.
  • Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs.

Required normalized fields: tag, value, unit, quality.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0107",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "tag": "LAB.TankLevel",
    "value": 42,
    "unit": "percent",
    "quality": "good"
  }
}

Visibility limits: There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.

Process/Event Alarm · source-mapped

DC0109 collection page — Export alarm/event history with setpoint context and lifecycle transitions; retain suppressed/shelved state when provided.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.
  • Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.
  • Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs.

Required normalized fields: tag, alarm, threshold, value, acknowledged.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0109",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "tag": "LAB.TankLevel",
    "alarm": "high_level",
    "threshold": 80,
    "value": 82,
    "acknowledged": false
  }
}

Visibility limits: There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0728 Detection of Alarm Suppression

MITRE detection strategy

AN1861 Analytic 1861

Real-time monitoring of the alarm and process historian layer identifies an alarm status transitioning to suppressed, shelved, disabled, or acknowledged without a corresponding operator action recorded within a grace period, correlated with Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol write traffic to alarm configuration or threshold registers arriving in the same window from a source not in the approved engineering list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.

Platforms: Embedded.

  • Process/Event Alarm — operationaldb:AlarmEvent; channel alarm status transitions to suppressed/shelved/disabled/acknowledged without matching operator_id entry within suppress grace period.
  • Process History/Live Data — operationaldb:ProcessHistory; channel process value crosses known alarm threshold but no corresponding alarm event recorded within expected latency window.
  • Network Traffic Content — NSM:Content; channel Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) dataset stNum value decreases (replay indicator) or test-mode bit asserted on protection relay without scheduled maintenance.
  • Network Traffic Flow — NSM:Content; channel write function code targeting alarm config address range from source not in approved write sources within suppress grace period of the alarm status change.

AN2107 Analytic 2107

Real-time monitoring identifies a write to alarm configuration files on a Linux-based Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)/alarm server by a User Identifier (UID) that is not the alarm management service, or the alarm management service process receiving Application Programming Interface (API) calls that suppress alarm classes without a corresponding operator session. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.

Platforms: Linux.

  • Device Alarm — alarmserver:ApplicationLog; channel alarm suppression Application Programming Interface (API) call logged without operator session identifier (ID).
  • File Modification — auditd:SYSCALL+PATH; channel Linux Audit SYSCALL+PATH records: write to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) alarm configuration file by User Identifier (UID) not in authorized alarm admin UIDs.

AN2108 Analytic 2108

Real-time monitoring identifies a write to alarm configuration files or database tables on an Human-Machine Interface (HMI)/alarm server by a process other than the recognized alarm management application, or an alarm-class-disable Application Programming Interface (API) call logged without a corresponding operator session ID in the HMI audit trail. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.

Platforms: Windows.

  • Device Alarm — alarmserver:ApplicationLog; channel alarm class disabled or suppressed Application Programming Interface (API) event logged without operator_id field populated.
  • File Creation — WinEventLog:Sysmon; channel EventCode=11 of alarm config paths by image not in Human-Machine Interface (HMI) alarm parent allowlist.

AN2188 Analytic 2188

Real-time monitoring identifies a network-device ACL, filter, or rate-limit policy change that suppresses or blocks ICS alarm-notification traffic outside the approved network-change baseline. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.

Platforms: Network Devices.

  • Application Log Content — networkdevice:syslog; channel Access Control List (ACL)/policy change affecting alarm notification traffic ports without corresponding change ticket.
Source rule directory and observation requirements

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T0878 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Application and service audit: Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines.
  • Industrial operations and physical process: Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects.
  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Network and protocol telemetry: Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: no compatible candidate in this snapshot. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.

No compatible Atomic procedure is present in this pinned evidence set. Technical feasibility has not been ruled out. A custom procedure must define the behavior, target, collection point, success observable and rollback before execution.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T0878 Alarm Suppression; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Alarm Suppression, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Detection and collection

T0878 detection workspace

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.